Prison: Inmate Parole Release Law 1- 888-200-8385

In re Shaputis (II) 12/29/11 - Difficult case for LIFERs

2012-01-12T20:38:00.000-08:00

Case Name: In re Shaputis (II) , CalSup , Case #: S188655
Opinion Date: 12/29/2011 , DAR #: 18585

Although the case is not very favorable to the Lifers there is a very good concurring opinion from Justice Liu, J. that almost sounds like a dissent, thus, giving golden nuggets of advice. See the short extract below:

CONCUR BY: Werdegar; Chin; Liu

The emphasis on judicial deference is part of the court's effort to summarize the principles governing judicial review of parole decisions. Because today's opinion focuses on the obligations of reviewing courts, I think it useful and complementary to summarize a few principles governing the Board's obligations as well.

As we have repeatedly said, the parole statute and regulations put the onus on the Board to justify denial of parole: " '[T]he governing statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction. (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (b).) And as set forth in the governing regulations, the Board must set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its judgment after considering the circumstances enumerated in section 2402 of the regulations, that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole. Accordingly, parole applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.' (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 654, [*60] italics added; see also In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 366 ['parole is the rule, rather than the exception'].)" (Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)

In light of this basic statutory obligation to grant parole unless public safety is at risk, we have held that the Board, as a matter of due process, has a duty to provide "a definitive written statement of its reasons for denying parole." (In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 272.) The requirement of a definitive written statement of reasons serves two functions.

First, it serves to "adequately inform the inmate" of the reasons for the denial (ibid.) so that the inmate is given a fair opportunity to make the life changes necessary to be considered suitable for parole in the future.

Second, the requirement fulfills the "mandate that a basis for administrative action must be set forth with sufficient clarity as to be understandable" so as "to afford an adequate basis for judicial review." (Ibid.) Although the Board is not required to "comprehensively martial the evidentiary support for its reasons" (maj. opn, ante, at p. 24, fn. 11), it is required to point to evidence in the record that supports its reasoning. Otherwise, the statement of reasons would be conclusory and would fail to concretely inform the prisoner and the reviewing court of the Board's decision-making process.

The Board's obligation to provide a definitive written statement of reasons for denying parole shapes the nature of judicial review. As we said in Lawrence, the task of reviewing courts is to "determine whether the facts relied upon by the Board or the Governor support the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety" (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213) and specifically to determine whether the Board's or the Governor's decision includes "reasoning establishing a rational nexus" between identified unsuitability factors and current dangerousness (id. at p. 1210).

In other words, the focus of judicial review is on the rationality of the Board's or the Governor's decision-not only the ultimate conclusion of current dangerousness - but also the evidence and reasoning on which the Board or Governor actually relied to reach that conclusion

Case Holding:

The Court of Appeal erred in re-weighing the evidence relied upon by the executive branch when it found petitioner unsuitable for parole.

Petitioner was convicted of the second degree murder of his wife in 1987 and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus two years for a gun use. The Governor's reversal of petitioner's 2006 grant of parole was reversed by the Court of Appeal.

On review the Supreme Court found the question in determining suitability for parole is whether the inmate currently poses a public safety threat. This issue is directed to the executive branch -- first to the BPH and then to the Governor, who may review the entire record in evaluating the inmate's progress during incarceration.

The inmate's insight into the life crime is a relevant factor in determining current dangerousness. An inmate's decision not to participate in the parole hearing or psychological evaluations prepared for the hearing may not be held against him, but such lack of involvement does not limit the BPH or the Governor in their evaluation of the evidence.

A court reviewing a parole determination must employ the highly deferential "some evidence" standard, which requires it to uphold the executive branch's decision as long as there is a "modicum of evidence" to support the parole suitability finding. The question whether the inmate is currently dangerous is reserved to the executive branch. The reviewing court is not authorized to reweigh the evidence -- it must uphold the parole suitability finding if "there is a rational nexus between the evidence and the ultimate determination of current dangerousness." Reversed.

In re Lira 12/6/2011: Entitled to credit to reduce his parole term

2011-12-19T18:33:00.000-08:00

Case Name: In re Lira , District: 6 DCA , Case #: H036162
Opinion Date: 12/6/2011 , DAR #: 17446

In Short:
Due to the Governor's erroneous reversal of the Board's grant of suitability, the inmate is entitled to credit for days of unlawful imprisonment to reduce his parole term!

Case Holding:
A lifer inmate held in prison following the Governor's erroneous veto of the Board of Parole Hearing's order for his parole release is entitled to reinstatement of the Board's order and credit for days of unlawful imprisonment to reduce his parole term. Johnny Lira was released from an indeterminate life sentence for a murder committed in 1980, after he had been found unsuitable by the Board in 2005 and suitable in 2008, with that order vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger.

In 2009, the Board again found Lisa suitable for parole and Governor Brown declined to review the decision. In habeas proceedings, Lira claimed four years of credit for the period of incarceration after the Board's 2005 denial, and for his further incarceration caused by the Governor Schwarzenegger's veto. The trial court granted habeas relief with credit after the 2005 denial.

The appellate court partially disagreed, finding that imprisonment was lawful until the 2008 suitability finding and credit allowed only from the date of veto. The Governor's decision was not supported by "some evidence" and was erroneous. The reversal of the Governor's veto and reinstatement of the Board's finding establishes that the inmate should not have been incarcerated beyond the Board's original 2008 suitability finding. Thus, the appellate court gave credit from the 2008 original Suitability year.

(Note: Penal Code section 3000.1, providing that a person convicted of murder after January 1, 1983 is subject to a lifetime of parole and service of five continuous years on parole prior to discharge, did not apply in this case.)

Irregularities in OAL approval of Section 2240 of Title 15 Forensic Assessment Division (FAD)

2011-12-02T13:20:00.000-08:00

While the OAL approved the change to section 2240 of Title 15 regarding the Forensic Assessment Division (FAD) and psych evals, there were some irregularities in this approval and Life Support Alliance (LSA, 916-402-3750), in conjunction with legal advisers, is contemplating a challenge to the approval. Opinions/thoughts from the legal minds is requested by Vanessa Nelson at lifesupportalliance@gmail.com.

OAL's approval of 2240 changes became effective Nov. 24, 2011, thus codifying the Forensic Assessment Division and psychological evaluations. These amendments imply that the LIFER inmates will be mandated to present themselves (among others) at the Forensic Psychological Evaluation interview that is normally done before a LIFER Parole Suitability Hearing is completed.

In addition, BPH in its Revised Initial Statement of Reasons to its proposed amendments misrepresented Psychologists participation and conclusions. No consensus was ever reached about 'state of the art,' risk assessment instruments.The three (3) actuarial instruments used have not been validated with the LIFER population.

=========================
Dr. Barry Krisberg Berkeley Law school states:

It has come to my attention that the Board of Parole Hearings, in its Revised Initial Statement of Reasons to its Proposed Regulation 15 CCR §2240, has misrepresented my participation in a meeting with the Board on August 2, 2006. According to the Statement of Reasons, "the Board of Parole Hearings convened a meeting of experts from the forensic scientific community," including myself, "to reach a consensus, based on the 'state of the art,' what risk and needs assessment instruments would best be employed by the State of California for adult inmates sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole."

The Board's Statement of Reasons appears to imply that this panel reached such a consensus and agreed that a battery of risk assessment tools should be administered to term-to-life prisoners. The Board states, "The panel determined that the two best objective risk assessment tools to employ on the population of adult inmates sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole were the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI) and the HCR‐20 (Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management). Both the LS/CMI and HCR‐20 would be administered to the inmate as part of the risk assessment battery."

This is a misrepresentation of the meeting that I attended; the panel reached no such consensus, and I continue to disagree with the administration of these risk assessment tools to term‐to‐life prisoners. Neither the LS/CMI nor the HCR‐20/PCL‐R has been validated for a population such as California's term‐to‐life prisoners.
=======================

There were many issues raised in objection to this Amendments and they were not answered. There is a consensus (by the criminal defense attorneys, among others) that this OAL approval was improperly done.

If you are a defense attorney representing an inmate at their LIFER Parole Hearing be mindful of this new Section 2240 Amendment and all of its impact if you chose to advise your client not to attend the Psychological interview. If you are not an Attorney, please Consult an Attorney that emphasizes representation in this area of law.

Ochoa v. Sup. Court of Santa Clara Court- CONFIDENTIAL FILE access

2011-10-28T17:48:00.000-07:00

Case Name: Ochoa v. Sup. Court of Santa Clara Co. , District: 6 DCA ,
Case #: H036970
Opinion Date: 10/13/2011 , DAR #: 15203

QUICK GLANCE: Confidential File portion in the Inmates Central File MAY be access via a Court "in camera" hearing with the Warden must be present. This is to determine how much of the confidential information CAN be disclosed without disclosing the informant's identity.

Case Holding:
In a parole proceeding, the warden may decline to disclose the identity of a prison informant against the inmate if there is a valid state interest in keeping the informant's identity confidential.

Glasgow was convicted of first degree murder in 1980 and sentenced to state prison for thirty years to life. In 2010, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found him suitable for parole but the Governor reversed the decision, based, in part, on confidential information that Glasgow sold his prescribed pain medication to other inmates.

Glasgow challenged the decision in a writ action and the superior court ordered disclosure of the confidential information or reconsideration of parole without the information. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ vacating the order.

An inmate seeking parole does not have the same minimum due process rights as the parolee in a Morrissey hearing (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471.) Instead, the rights of an inmate seeking parole are considered on a case by case basis, with the state's interests weighed against those of the inmates. For security and safety, the warden may refuse to disclose confidential information (Evid. Code, sec. 1040). If a claim of privilege is made, the court may require an in camera hearing to determine if the information is privileged and if it is, it may not be disclosed.

Here, the superior court, in an in camera hearing, determined that the confidential documents were relevant and reliable, allowing the warden to exert non disclosure under section 1040.

However, the appellate court concluded that an in camera hearing with the warden must now be held to determine how much of the confidential information could be disclosed without disclosing the informant's identity, such that Glasgow's rights to a fair parole determination can be balanced with the state’s right of nondisclosure.

Inmates on a 9-day-old hunger strike at CDCR

2011-10-05T02:21:00.000-07:00

(Reuters) - Thousands of inmates in up to eight California prisons have taken part in a 9-day-old hunger strike, demanding an end to what they call inhumane conditions, prison officials and an inmate advocacy group said on Tuesday.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was counting 1,186 inmates in four prisons as participating in the hunger strike as of Tuesday, down from more than 4,200 inmates at eight prisons on September 29.

But a prisoner rights group put the number of strike participants higher, saying as many as 12,000 inmates at eight California state prisons have taken part in refusing to eat.

The protest comes as California has begun carrying out a state-mandated plan to ease prison overcrowding by shifting responsibility for thousands of inmates and ex-convicts to county authorities.

The current hunger strike grew out of a protest started in July by prisoners housed in Northern California's Pelican Bay State Prison.

Inmates there were pressing a list of five demands -- an end to group punishments; an end to a policy that requires an inmate to identify fellow gang members in exchange for getting out of solitary confinement; an end to long-term solitary confinement; adequate and nutritious food; and greater privileges for prisoners confined to isolation indefinitely.

The original Pelican Bay strike ended in late July after prison officials promised some concessions. But the protest resumed on September 26 after inmates complained their concerns were not immediately addressed. The strike has since spread to prisons throughout the state.

The prison strike run from Northern CA at Pelican Bay all the way down to Southern CA at Ironwood State Prison (ISP).

============
Monday 10/4/2011: State corrections officials said the number of striking inmates is far lower than reported by advocates. As of Monday, officials said there are 1,245 inmates at 4 prisons who have missed nine or more consecutive meals since Sept. 26. The number of inmates who had missed nine or more consecutive meals peaked Sept. 29 with 4,252 inmates at 8 state prisons.

CDCR Report to meet June 2012 Population Reduction Benchmark

2011-08-18T14:16:00.000-07:00

CDCR Files Report with Court Showing State Will Meet June 2012 Population Reduction Benchmark.

Unfortunately, this reduction will not impact the LIFERs, which are considered to have a VIOLENT offense, thus not qualifying for the reduction.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) expects to meet the Three-Judge Court’s July 27, 2012, benchmark for reducing the state’s inmate population, according to an August 16, 2011, report filed by the department. The report shows CDCR will reduce its inmate population to 155 percent of prison design capacity by the court’s benchmark date of July 27, 2012.

A new CDCR website can be viewed:
www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html

To assist in the reduction, as of October 1, 2011 Implementation of the Realignment will begin. All individuals sentenced to non-serious, non-violent or non-sex offenses will serve their sentences in county jails instead of state prison. No inmates currently in state prison will be transferred to county jails or released early.

The 3-ring Circus: Marsys' Law: thumbs up or down?

2011-08-05T20:58:00.000-07:00

We previously reported (in this Blog) on In Re Vicks as a "good" Lifer cases, that concluded Marsy's law to be a violation the Ex Post Facto Principle. If we look at 3 consecutive months of Decisions, we find a "mix" analysis from the San Diego County 4th District Court of Appeals.

Unfortunately, the In Re Russo panel recently issued another published ruling In re Aragon, where it rejected its sister panel's In re Vicks analysis and reinforced its own In re Russo analysis!!!

Therefore, we must wait the finality of these 3 cases stated below, to know where Lifers stand on the State-Court rulings on the Question: "Is Marsy's Law considered Ex Post Facto as applied to the Lifers whose crime occurred PRIOR to Proposition 9 (aka Marsy's Law, 2008)?

CONFLICTING COURT CASES:

In re Russo (2011), Cal.App.4th (No. D057405 Fourt Dist.. Div One. April 8, 2011)

In conclusion, the Court held that Marsy's law was just an "admistrative method by which a parole release date is set..." and concluded that no ex post facto violation occurred.

In Re Vicks (2011), Cal.App.4th (No. D056998. Fourt Dist.. Div One. May 11, 2011).

In conclusion, the Court conclude the application of the amendments to Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision (b), to inmates whose commitment offense was committed prior to the effective date of Marsy's Law (November 5, 2008) violates ex post facto principles.

In re Aragon (2011), Cal.App.4th (No. D058040 Fourt Dist.. Div One. June 9, 2011).

In conclusion, the Court rejected the In re Vicks panel's conclusion and stated that Marsy's Law does NOT violate the ex post facto principles.

In re Ryner 6/10/11: Prior Board decision are NOT suff. evidence to Reverse Grant

2011-07-12T00:43:00.000-07:00

Another win for the Lifers! The Governor can not reverse a finding of Suitability by reaching back to a Prior Board's decision to find evidence for the reversal.

Case Name: In re Ryner , District: 6 DCA , Case #: H035893
Opinion Date: 6/10/2011 , DAR #: 8563

Case Holding:
Prior Parole Board decisions are not independent evidence sufficient to support the Governor's current reversal of the Board's finding of parole suitability. At the 2009 parole suitability hearing, the Board of Parole granted petitioner parole. The Board noted that although a 2008 psychological evaluation called for petitioner's further exploration of issues that resulted in the commitment murder offense, petitioner had since addressed these issues.

The Governor, referencing prior Board findings as to the nature of the commitment offense, the 2008 psychological evaluation addressing petitioner's lack of insight into motivation for the murder, and petitioner's failure to avail himself of programs, reversed the Board's ruling, finding appellant continued to represent a threat to public safety.

The appellate court agreed with the superior court's rejection of the Governor's basis for finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. In conducting its review of the Board's decision, the Governor is required to consider the same factors considered by the Board and the opinions of previous Board decisions do not constitute independent evidence of petitioner's suitability for parole.

Remand to the Governor for further action was not a proper remedy in this case because the court's review of the record before the Board and the Governor produced no evidence that would support any action other than petitioner’s release on parole.

In re Nguyen 5/23/11 Governor Reversal using Psych eval - not supported by evidence

2011-06-08T11:12:00.000-07:00

In re Nguyen, G043844

Another big win for the inmates. Governor can not find fault in the Psychological evaluation and expect that fault to be considered "some evidence" to support a reversal!!!

District: 4 DCA, Division: 3,
Opinion date: 5/23/11, DAR#: 7391

Case facts summary:

The Governor's decision reversing a Board decision for release on parole must be supported by evidence in the record, but it is not supported by finding fault with the extent of examination done by a mental health evaluator in reaching the conclusion that the inmate had insight into his offense.

In 1990, petitioner in the underlying matter, Hank Nguyen, murdered his former girlfriend, Tina Tham, who had broken off their relationship eight months earlier. On June 28, 1991, after the jury convicted Nguyen of murder, the court sentenced him to 15 years to life in state prison.

Nguyen entered prison with no prior juvenile or adult criminal record, except the current offense for which he has accepted full responsibility and expressed sincere remorse. In prison, he successfully completed a panoply of courses to strengthen his mind and skills and increase his self-insight. He was discipline free during his entire incarceration, and kept himself busy working as a plumber and providing math tutoring to other inmates. The Board found Nguyen‟s institutional behavior “remarkable” and commented it could not “have asked for any more compliance or improvement.” Apparently brushing aside Nguyen‟s accomplishments, the Governor found fault with a mental health evaluator for not exploring more about the cause of defendant‟s behavior.

Decision summary The Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found Nguyen suitable for parole in June 2009. The Governor reversed the Board‟s decision, finding the crime “extraordinar[ily] callous, heinous and atrocious,”. The Board also found that Nguyen had not fully accepted responsibility for the murder or developed a sense of genuine remorse.

The judgment of the trial court granting habeas relief is affirmed where the absence of a psychological evaluation does not amount to some evidence that petitioner currently poses an unreasonable threat to the public if released from prison.

In re Vicks 5/11/2011 - Marsy's Law Violates Ex Post Facto Principle - Big Win for Lifers!

2011-05-13T16:58:00.000-07:00

In re Vicks (2011) , Cal.App.4th
[No. D056998. Fourth Dist., Div. One. May 11, 2011.]

OPINION

McDONALD, J.-

In 1983, Michael Vicks was convicted of two counts of rape in concert, two counts of forcible oral copulation in concert, three counts of kidnapping, one count of kidnapping to commit robbery, and multiple counts of robbery; many of these convictions included true findings on appended firearm enhancements. Vicks was sentenced to a total term of 37 years 8 months to life. Vicks, now 51 years old, has been incarcerated for more than 28 years.

At Vicks's first parole hearing, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found him unsuitable for parole. The BPH found the commitment offense was particularly egregious under many indices and, considering numerous other factors (including Vicks's prior criminal record, his disciplinary record while incarcerated, his failure to gain insight into the commitment offense, and his psychological evaluation), concluded Vicks was not currently suitable for parole. The BPH further concluded a five-year denial of parole was appropriate under the circumstances.

Vicks petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the court denied the writ, concluding the BPH's decision was supported by some evidence. Vicks then petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause, the People filed a return, and Vicks filed a traverse.

Vicks asserts the BPH's decision to deny parole violated due process because its conclusion that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole was contrary to the only reliable evidence that he was not currently dangerous. He also asserts the imposition of a five-year deferral, pursuant to the amendments to Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision (b), adopted after the voters approved Proposition 9, otherwise known as the "Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law" (hereafter Marsy's Law), cannot be applied to him without violating ex post facto principles.

We conclude the BPH's decision to deny parole was supported by some evidence, pursuant to the guidance provided by In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence) and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241.

We also conclude application of the amendments to Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision (b), to inmates whose commitment offense was committed prior to the effective date of Marsy's Law violates ex post facto principles.

In re Jackson: Big win for Lifers via Penal Code 5011: no need to admit

2011-04-07T20:38:00.000-07:00

Here's a bombshell, out of the COURT OF APPEAL SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE. Great win!

3/30/2011 - Certified for Publication
Case: B228409, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A624068

ISSUE: Why the Board of Parole Hearings‘ decision to deny petitioner parole did not violate Penal Code section 5011, subdivision (b), and California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2236, by relying, either directly or indirectly, on petitioner‘s refusal to admit guilt!

BACKGROUND: The present case is analogous to Palermo and McDonald. The Board did not directly state that Jackson was unsuitable for parole due to his refusal to admit he was 16
guilty of the commitment offense—indeed, the Board stressed that Jackson was not required to admit guilt. Instead, the Board denied Jackson parole based on its findings that Jackson lacked insight into the crime, failed to take responsibility for it, and did not have remorse. But the only evidence to support these findings was Jackson‘s refusal to admit he shot and killed Sharon Wade!

CONCLUSION: Because the only basis for the Board to conclude Jackson lacked insight, failed to take responsibility, and lacked remorse was his refusal to admit guilt for the commitment offense, the Board indirectly relied on that refusal to deny Jackson parole.

By doing so, the Board violated section 5011, subdivision (b) and California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2236. It is also important to recognize that like Palermo and McDonald, this is not a case where the inmate‘s version of the crime was physically impossible or strained credulity. While there was certainly substantial evidence to support the trial court‘s finding that Jackson murdered Wade, Jackson‘s denial of that allegation is not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence.

Further, like the inmates in Palermo and McDonald, Jackson accepted responsibility for the death of his victim, behaved well in prison, successfully engaged in self-improvement activity while there, and received positive reports regarding his potential dangerousness by prison psychologists.

Under these circumstances, Jackson‘s continuing insistence that he did not shoot and kill Wade does not support the Board‘s finding that he remains a danger to public safety.

In re Loveless : win some, lose some: Looser for Lifers

2011-04-07T20:29:00.000-07:00

The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court order, finding there was "some evidence" supporting the board's decision.

Case Name: In re Loveless , District: 3 DCA , Case #: C062354
Opinion Date: 1/7/2011 , DAR #: 1739

Case Holding:

The standard of review for reviewing a parole decision is whether there is some evidence that an inmate poses a current risk to public safety, not merely whether there is some evidence to support the findings on the suitability or unsuitability factors.

Loveless was convicted of second degree murder based on the killing of a homeowner in front of his teenage son during the course of a home invasion robbery. At the time of the crime he was unemployed and an alcoholic. When Loveless came up for a parole hearing 22 years later, the board denied parole because the crime was "especially callous" and because he lacked insight and remorse, and had inadequate post-release plans.

The trial court reversed the denial of parole, and the warden appealed. The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court order, finding there was "some evidence" supporting the board's decision.

The evidence supports the board's findings regarding unsuitability factors, and there is a rational nexus between these findings and current dangerousness. Loveless did not adequately address post-release job prospects and stopped participating in AA, when unemployment and alcoholism were contributing factors to the crime.

Swarthout v. Cooke 1/24/11: No federal habeas relief for errors of state law

2011-02-04T13:26:00.000-08:00

A major disappointing case by the US Supreme Court for Lifers!

The federal review will only be available if the Inmate is not allowed an opportunity to be heard and provided a reasons why his parole was denied.

All defense attorney should now make a point of making a "record" at the Parole hearing when the inmates are "cut-off" by the Commissioners and not given the proper opportunity to speak!!!

Case Name: Swarthout v. Cooke & Cate v. Clay ,
District: USSup , Case #: 10-333
Opinion Date: 1/24/2011 , DAR #:1230

Case Holding:

In the context of California's parole statute, there is no federal habeas relief for errors of state law, and the federal review available is limited to whether the applicant was allowed an opportunity to be heard and advised of the reasons why parole was denied.

Cooke, convicted of attempted first-degree murder, was denied parole by the Board of Prison Terms, which found that he was not suitable because of the nature of the offense, his prison adjustment, failure to participate in rehabilitative programs, and failure to develop marketable skills. Clay was found suitable by the board but the Governor reversed the finding.

The Ninth Circuit granted relief, finding that the parole statute created a liberty interest protected by the due process clause and, in Cooke's case, the state made an unreasonable determination. The Ninth Circuit found that in Clay's case, the Governor's decision was an unreasonable application of the "some evidence rule."

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. Further, the liberty interest in parole is a state interest created by California law. There is no right under the federal Constitution to be conditionally released before expiration of sentence, and the states are under no duty to offer parole. If a state does offer parole, thereby creating a state liberty interest, the due process clause requires fair procedures for its implementation.

These State procedures are minimal, however, requiring only that the applicant has an opportunity to be heard and is advised of the reasons for parole denial. (Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1.) Here, both Cooke and Clay were offered the opportunity to speak at the parole hearing and were advised of the denial.

Thanks for the Summary from CCAP weekly news.

McCullough v. Kane 12/27/10 - District: 9 Cir. Inmate may obtain federal habeas review

2011-01-06T15:00:00.000-08:00

After being found suitable twice by the BOARD and reversed twice by the Governor...a Federal Petition is filed for relief.

Feds agree that they can review if there is an abuse of the CA "some evidence" standard!
===============

Case Name: McCullough v. Kane , District: 9 Cir , Case #: 07-16049
Opinion Date: 12/27/2010 , DAR #: 19318

Case Holding:

Under California's current parole laws, applicants for parole may obtain federal habeas review of whether there is "some evidence" supporting a negative parole decision. At a young age, McCullough was convicted of murder and sentenced to prison for life. Despite a less than positive initial prison adjustment, within a period of time, he performed admirably, obtaining a bachelor's degree in social work, helping with other prisoners, being psychologically evaluated as less likely to commit violence than the average community citizen, etc.

Twice the board recommended him for parole, and twice the Governor reversed, with the most recent reversal based on a finding that McCullough would pose an unreasonable risk of danger if released.

McCullough unsuccessfully pursued remedy through the state courts and filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court.

The court granted the petition and the state appealed. California parole law creates a cognizable interest in release on parole protected by due process, and a denial can be justified only with some evidence of dangerousness. Here, based on the record, the denial was an unreasonable application of decisions defining the scope of the state-created liberty in parole, such that the federal court, had jurisdiction to review under AEDPA.

Finding that the Governor's action in reversing violated McCullough's due process and statutory rights, the appellate court upheld the district court's decision granting the habeas corpus petition.

In re Twinn 11/23/10 Minimization did not support - that inmate was a current danger!

2010-12-02T16:28:00.000-08:00

Once again the "Governator- Arnold" gets Reversed by the Court who concurred with the Board's original suitability (for a release) recommendation.

We will see what JERRY BROWN will bring to the table for Lifers in 2011.

====================

In re Twinn, District: 2 DCA , Division: 7 , Case #: B225943
Opinion Date: 11/23/2010 , DAR #: 17681

CASE SUMMARY: (CCAP courtesy)
The Governor's reversal of the board's recommendation for parole required reversal where the petitioner's past minimization of his role in the crime did not support a finding that he was a current danger.

Appellant beat and killed a man who had assaulted his aunt. The coroner testified that while the death was immediately caused by the man's heart disease, the injuries from the beating contributed to the death. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life.

The Governor reversed the parole board's decision to grant parole based on the gravity of the commitment offense, lack of suitable post-release plans, and lack of insight since petitioner's statements in reports filed in 1991, 1995, and 2000 appeared to minimize his involvement in the offense. Appellant had commented that the death was accidental and caused by a heart attack.

Habeas proceedings ensued and the Court of Appeal reversed. The claim of inadequate post-release plans was not supported by some evidence because petitioner had a verified job offer and planned to live with his wife. And while there was a modicum of evidence in the record that appellant initially minimized involvement, the past minimization is not indicative of current dangerousness. Similarly, while there was some evidence to support the finding that the commitment offense was callous and cruel, there is no rational nexus between the offense and petitioner's current dangerousness.

In re McDonald, 11/2/2010, Denial of involvement in the commitment offense alone is an insufficient basis for denial of parole

2010-11-15T23:06:00.000-08:00

Case Name: In re McDonald , District: 2 DCA , Division: 7 ,
Case #: B219424,
Opinion Date: 11/2/2010 , DAR #: 16815

The Court finally acknowledges that PC 5011 - no need to admit guilt to be found suitable - must play a role at theses Parole Suitability Hearings, to allow inmates to be found suitable when they can not have insight into a crime they did not commit.

CASE SUMMARY:
Denial of involvement in the commitment offense alone is an insufficient basis for denial of parole. Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1999. He was tried as an adult, even though the offense occurred when he was sixteen years old. The conviction was based primarily on the testimony of other juveniles. Petitioner had no prior criminal record or history of school misconduct. He had no problems with alcohol or drugs, and during his prison term he had been a model prisoner. His release plans were realistic and positive.

The board found petitioner suitable for parole in 2006 and 2007, but each time the Governor reversed on the basis of the commitment offense and petitioner’s lack of insight and remorse. Throughout, petitioner had denied committing the offenses. In 2009, the board again found petitioner suitable for parole but the Governor reversed again, finding the aggravated nature of the crime and petitioner’s lack of insight based on his claim of limited responsibility suggested petitioner posed an unreasonable public safety risk.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s grant of petitioner’s habeas, noting that there was no nexus between the commitment offense and petitioner’s level of dangerousness. Further, pursuant to Penal Code section 5011, subdivision (b), a finding of dangerousness can not be predicated on petitioner’s admission of guilt. Although an inmate’s lack of remorse or insight into the offense can be considered in an assessment as to whether he poses a safety risk, when considered in the context of petitioner’s denial of commission of the offense, it alone is an insufficient basis for a finding that he continues to represent a safety threat.

The court found that, contrary to the People’s position, it was not necessary to remand the matter to permit the Governor to reconsider the record. The Constitution provides for a single review by the Governor of a determination by the board and does not authorize repeated reviews of that single determination. Petitioner, who had since been released on parole, was allowed to remain free from custody.

In re Powell 10/7/10 There was not "some evidence" to support BOARD findings of unsuitability

2010-10-21T19:03:00.000-07:00

Another Victory for the inmate -
The Board erroneously found Powell to be unsuitable.
Courts sided with the inmate!

In re Powell from District: 1 DCA , Division: 3 , Case #: A127641
Opinion Date: 10/7/2010 , DAR #: 15629

Case Holding:
There was not "some evidence" to support the parole board's conclusion that petitioner currently posed a danger to society if released from prison.

BACKGROUND:
Petitioner found his girlfriend in bed with another man, and he killed them both. In 1982, he was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and the use of a deadly weapon. In 2009, the parole board denied parole concluding the crimes were especially heinous, petitioner's history was unstable in that he used to abuse drugs and alcohol and had an incident of domestic violence with the victim, he lacked full insight, did not accept responsibility, and did not have an adequate post-release plan. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the superior court denied.

COURT OF APPEAL:
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding these reasons did not withstand scrutiny under the standard of In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, which requires "'some evidence' support the conclusion that the inmate would currently pose a danger to society if released." The commitment offenses and petitioner's prior history were too remote to remain valid indicators of present conduct since petitioner had no violent conduct in the past 29 years. Further, lack of insight and acceptance of responsibility are not even among the suitability factors listed in the regulations, although the former can be probative to the extent it is rationally indicative of current dangerousness, and the latter is closely related to the factor of showing remorse.

In this case, petitioner had accepted full responsibility and the alleged claim of lack of insight was not supported by record. As to post-release plans, the board itself characterized them as "well thought out." Because there was not some evidence to support the board's conclusion, the court remanded for reconsideration with all the available evidence, as that is the remedy consistent with In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238.

In re Kler 10/5/10 - All courts in California have original jurisdiction on a WHC

2010-10-14T22:35:00.000-07:00

In re Kler , District: 1 DCA , Division: 2 , Case #: A128153
Opinion Date: 10/5/2010 , DAR #: 15518

The CA Constitution vests all 3 levels of Court in California with original jurisdiction to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus (WHC), the California Rules of Court is contrary to constitutional provisions.

CASE HOLDING:

California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(c)(2), which requires that a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of parole be denied if it is not first adjudicated in the trial court rendering the underlying judgment, is inconsistent with the California Constitution. In 2009, the appellate court granted petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus that challenged a 2007 parole denial. Following a new hearing, the Board of Parole Hearings found petitioner suitable for parole; but in 2010, the Governor reversed. Petitioner then filed the present petition in the appellate court challenging the action by the Governor.

The Governor argued that California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(c)(2), prohibited the appellate court from entertaining the matter in the first instance. The appellate court disagreed.

California Rules of Court have the force of a statute to the extent they are not inconsistent with constitutional provisions. Rule 8.385 states the Court of Appeal must deny a petition challenging a denial of parole that is not first brought in the trial court. Rule 1.5 (b)(1) defines must as mandatory, whereas rule 1.5 (b)(5) defines should as expressing a preference. Because the Constitution vests all courts in California with original jurisdiction, the rule is contrary to constitutional provisions.

Under the Constitution, while a Court of Appeal may have original jurisdiction in a habeas proceeding, it has discretion to deny a petition not first presented to the trial court. “Among the three levels of state courts, a habeas corpus petition challenging a decision of the parole board should be filed in the superior court, which should entertain in the first instance the petition,” subject to a showing that any extraordinary reason exists for action by a different court. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593; In re Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294.) This case presented such an extraordinary reason. Since the issues presented flowed from the appellate court’s previous decision, no court would be better suited to hear the matter.

In re Prather 7/29/10 Court defines BOARD's discretion in Court Ordered BPH Hearings

2010-08-30T17:56:00.000-07:00

COURT ORDERED HEARING WILL BE MORE SCRUTINIZED specifically as to what remedies will be allowed by the Court and what "evidence" the BOARD will be allowed to review. Time will tell on how this decision actually plays out in reality. Most likely it will not have a major impact on the ultimate success of litigation.

In re Prather, 50 Cal. 4th 238
Cal Supreme Court case# S173269 and S172903

================================
When a court directs the Parole Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing, the court should not improperly limit the type of evidence the board is statutorily obliged to consider. The Supreme Court granted review to settle a split among the appellate courts as to what action a reviewing court could order the Parole Board to take when it grants a new parole-suitability hearing. The court held is improper for the reviewing court to order the board to consider only a limited category of evidence in making its finding. Specifically, the reviewing court should not order the board to consider only new and different evidence that has emerged since the suitability hearing under review. To do so violates the separation of powers doctrine. The board is the administrative agency within the executive branch that is authorized to grant parole, with veto power vesting in the Governor. While judicial review of parole-suitability is proper so that the petitioner has due process, an order limiting the board's discretion as to what factors it can consider on remand "impermissibly impairs the board's exercise of its inherent discretion to decide parole matters."
================================

The Court reasoned that the Board in performing its statutory duty to evaluate current dangerousness, should be allowed to consider the entire record as it applies at the time of remand. But the Court decreed limitations. If the remanding court makes express findings of fact (e.g., not "some evidence" of danger in psych reports; or not "some evidence" of danger in parole plans), on remand, the Board cannot reconsider these factor However, if "new evidence" has materialized since the prior hearing, the Panel may consider not only that evidence, but also how it interrelates with prior evidence, in reaching its current dangerousness assessment.

Justice Moreno in a concurring and clarifying opinion wrote:
"an order expediting a remedy is not improper, particularly if a previous remand was ordered by the court. If a court is faced with slapping the Board's hands on a subsequent challenge to remanded hearing, then a more drastic intervention, such as an outright order that the Board grant Parole, may be warranted."

Office of the Inspector General finds numerous problems with the BOARD's "hired guns" (Psychologists)

2010-07-08T09:13:00.000-07:00

The Senate Rules Committee asked the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to investigate at least two aspects of the Board’s psych reports: (1) the factual errors in the reports and (2) psychologists who give lifers higher risk predictions than they received in older reports. The OIG found numerous problems with the reports and noted that these problems put the state at risk of legal challenges and they destroy confidence in the parole consideration process. Here are some highlights:

I - Errors in the Forensic Psychological Reports

· Even though psych reports include the statement that the psychologist reviewed the prisoner’s central file, this is not true. They only review a few documents pulled from the central file by records staff.

· The Board does not actually know how many factual errors are contained in psychological reports, but 100% of the reports in a sample from 2009 contained factual errors. Each report had between one and four factual errors. However, the true number of errors is unknown because the commissioners’ reports of these errors are inaccurate and misleading.

· Senior Psychologists, who are supposed to review and approve the reports written by staff psychologists, never check the sources of statements made in the reports, so even obvious errors and misstatements are overlooked when the reports are approved.

II -The Board Does Not Track Bad Psychologists

· The Board does not have a good way to keep track of how many low-risk, moderate-risk, and high-risk predictions psychologists put in their reports, so they are unable to identify patterns and problems. For this reason, the main question the OIG was interested in – whether the new psychologists exaggerate risk – could not be answered.

· The senior psychologists work out of their homes (not in a central office), and the Board does not keep track of what they do with their time, how many evaluations they actually review or the quality of their work.

III - Commissioners and Prisoners/Attorneys Disagree about Reliability of Reports

· Commissioners thought the psych reports were reliable and that very few of them have errors. Lifers’ attorneys, however, believed a much higher percentage of reports had errors, and they generally found the evaluations to be less reliable than commissioners thought they were.

IV - Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Senior Psychologists Lack Training

· Penal Code section 5076.6 requires commissioners and deputy commissioners to receive 40 hours of mandatory training within 60 days of their appointment and 40 hours every year after that. Although commissioners did receive the initial training, none of the 10 commissioners on the job long enough received the mandatory 40 hours each year after that. They all received less than half of the mandatory training, and some received as little as 25% of it.

· Only 3 out of the 16 deputy commissioners that were recently hired received the 40 hours of training at the beginning, and only 2 of the 70 total number of deputy commissioners received the mandatory 40 hours after that. On average, they received less than half of the mandatory training each year.

· Government Code section 19995.4 requires senior psychologists to receive at least 80 hours mandatory training within 12 months of their appointment; however, none of the senior psychologists received this training. In fact, one senior psychologist had not received any training as a supervisor until he had been on the job for more than two years.

V- LIFER Hearing Postponements Likely to Increase Again

· For hearings scheduled in or after October 2010, the Board may not have enough psychologists to complete all the necessary reports because 14 staff psychologists they hired for a limited time lost their jobs at the end of June 2010.

VI - OIG Will Review the Quality of Psychological Evaluations

· The OIG is hiring an independent psychologist to study the accuracy and validity of the Board’s psychological evaluations. The OIG will report on that study when it is complete.

The OIG website is at http://oig.ca.gov/

The full report is available at
http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BOA/reports/Special%20Report%20on%20the%20Board%20of%20Parole%20Hearings%20Psychological%20Evaluations%20and%20Mandatory%20Training%20Requirements.pdf

Information contributed by: Attorney Keith Wattley

5/24/10 Pearson v. Muntz (9th Cir): State's claims were based on a misreading of Hayward v. Marshall (2010)

2010-06-11T23:39:00.000-07:00

Case Holding:

A state-created right, such as California's requirement that parole be granted unless there some evidence of future dangerousness, may give rise to a protected liberty interest that can be enforced as a matter of federal law and via a federal habeas petition. The district court granted the California prisoner's habeas petition because the Governor's decision reversing a grant of parole was not supported by some evidence. The State filed a stay alleging the district court applied the wrong law, and the Ninth Circuit granted the stay until it decided Hayward v. Marshall (2010) __ F.3d __ (06-55392).

In Hayward, the court held that federal habeas claims by California prisoners based on parole denials must decide whether the "some evidence" requirement used by California courts was unreasonably applied. After the Hayward opinion, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay. The State filed a motion for reconsideration. But because all of the State's claims were based on a misreading of Hayward, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

3/25/10 In re Loresch - Denial of parole to a life prisoner may not be based on the aggravated nature of the crime, by itself!

2010-06-11T23:33:00.000-07:00

Case Holding:

Denial of parole to a life prisoner may not be based on the aggravated nature of the crime, by itself, as "some evidence" of current dangerousness. The Governor reversed a decision by the Board of Parole Hearings to grant Loresch parole. The Governor's order rested solely on the aggravated nature of the murder and speculation that the inmate could relapse and render him currently dangerous.

The appellate court rejected the Governor's argument that the remedy, should the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted, would be to remand for the Governor's further consideration. The opinion implores the Governor to reconsider his views and moderate them so as to restore confidence in the board's determination and stop second guessing parole-suitability determinations made by the experts.

5/12/2010 In re Calderon "INSIGHT" not a factor for SUITABILITY

2010-06-11T23:26:00.000-07:00

Court of Appeal First District, Division 2

Case Holding:

Lack of insight is not a factor indicative of unsuitability for parole. The Governor reversed the parole board's decision to grant parole to petitioner, who had committed a murder during the course of a robbery. The Court of Appeal reversed. Besides the gravity of the crime, the Governor found petitioner unsuitable based on continued criminal behavior in prison and his "lack of full insight" into the effects of his prior substance abuse.

The court found the Governor's reasons did not withstand scrutiny under the In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 standards. This crime was no more serious than other second-degree murders. Relevant post-conviction factors do not show current dangerousness since petitioner's brief association with a prison gang ended many years ago. And his alleged "lack of insight" on substance-abuse effects has no basis in the record.

After In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, where the phrase "lack of insight" was mentioned in upholding the Governor's decision on parole ineligibility, it has become the Governor's new mantra. But, it is not even among the factors indicative of unsuitability in the regulations. Lack of insight is probative of unsuitability only to the extent it is supported by the record and rationally indicative of current dangerousness.

5/22/10 FREE LEGAL ADVICE for Families of the Incarcerated

2010-05-14T00:06:00.000-07:00

WHAT:
FREE LEGAL ADVICE for Families of the Incarcerated - NO sign up needed - just show up. Attorney Letarte has represented over 1000+ inmates at Parole Suitability Hearings. She also represented inmates in the Court system on Appeals. With her last successful Writs printed on this Blog in the April posting.

WHO:
Diane T. Letarte, MBA, LLM
Former President, NC Lawyers Club
Judge ProTem – Superior Court of CA
1080 Park Blvd., Suite 1008
San Diego, CA 92101
619-233-3688 Fax: 233-3689
www.dianeletarte.com

WHEN: Sat 5/22/10 at 9:30am-Noon

WHERE:
First Evangelist Free Church of Los Angeles
1356 Albany St
Los Angeles, CA 90015

AGENDA:
9:30 am to 11:30am Tips for Lifers & Family
11:30am to 12:00pm: Qs & As

CONTACT: Amalia Molina or Nasim Khansari 213-438-4820 x16

4/9/10 Mr. Jimenez found Suitable - Reversing the BOARD's Decision

2010-04-25T12:19:00.000-07:00

Another win for the inmates at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (CVSP).
Our office was successful in getting Mr. Jimenez found suitable through the Court of Appeals. He will be having a new hearing in June 2010 to calculate his Parole Release Date.

______________________
B218498
(Los Angeles County and Super. Ct. Nos. KA014004, BH005965)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Patricia M. Schnegg, Judge. Petition granted.
Diane T. Letarte, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Malone, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Amy M. Roebuck, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
_______________________

Petitioner Hugo Jimenez seeks review of a September 10, 2008 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) finding him unsuitable for parole. He contends the Board’s decision is not supported by some evidence of his current dangerousness. (In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181.) We agree, and grant the petition.
----------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the Board of Parole Hearing’s September 10, 2008 decision is vacated. The Board is directed to find Jimenez suitable for parole unless, within 30 days of the finality of this decision, the Board holds a parole suitability hearing and finds, based on new evidence, that Jimenez currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

In re Juarez - filed March 16, 2010, BOARD abused its discretion - Another Win for inmates!

2010-03-17T00:25:00.000-07:00

In re Juarez - filed March 16, 2010,
Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two
Cite as A125665

SUMMARY: The BOARD abused its discretion and denied Juarez his due process rights by its reliance on three reasons. 1) "Credibility" because he blacked out at the wheel, 2) Heinous nature of offense, and 3) violent criminal history.

No evidence supported parole board decision to deny petitioner parole where petitioner had for some time fully accepted responsibility for his commitment offense and for knowingly driving while high on PCP; not disputed any of the facts of his crime; expressed remorse for killing victim; been a model prisoner, an ongoing participant in Alcoholics Anonymous and a past participant in Narcotics Anonymous; acknowledged that he was an alcoholic and a drug addict; pledged to continue his participation in AA after his release with the help of his family and an arranged sponsor; became a licensed optician and successfully taught other prisoners seeking to become licensed themselves; had a supportive family, realistic parole plans, and multiple job offers; and had undergone three recent psychological evaluations which concluded that he posed a low risk for violence if released.

Given petitioner’s acknowledgment of responsibility for his commitment offense and the substance abuse that caused it, his lack of memory of the incident was not probative of current dangerousness and board abused its discretion in relying on questions about petitioner’s credibility in denying parole. No evidence supported board’s conclusion that petitioner’s commitment offense was carried out in "an especially heinous, cruel and callous manner" nor was there a rational nexus between the nature of his offense and any current dangerousness where incident took place 27 years earlier when petitioner was a young man with a substance abuse problem who unintentionally killed a man in a traffic collision he caused while driving under the influence of narcotics and speeding away from police. Petitioner’s prior criminal history did not support the conclusion that he was currently dangerous where his prior offenses mostly involved reckless behavior while under the influence of an impairing substance and belligerent behavior when confronted by police and did not demonstrate an escalating pattern of criminal behavior or a significant history of violent crime.

DISPOSITION: The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The Board is directed to hold a hearing within 30 days of the finality of this decision, find Juarez suitable for parole, and set sentence appropriate to this determination, unless new evidence of his conduct and/or change in mental state subsequent to the 2008 parole hearing is introduced and is sufficient to support a finding that he currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole.

Full text http://www.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0310%2FA125665

In re Moses - March 16, 2010, Governor's Parole Date reversal found unacceptable

2010-03-16T22:04:00.000-07:00

In re Moses - filed March 16, 2010,
Court of Appeal - First Appellate District, Division Two
Cite as A124814

SUMMARY: An inmate served 29 years of a 17-years-to-life prison term for second degree murder and had an exemplary prison record, and Governor’s asserted reasons for denying parole:

1) that the murder was "especially atrocious,"
2) that inmate had maintained claim of self-defense, and
3) that he "had a significant record of criminal violence"

The Governor's characterization are not supported by the evidence in the record, the inmate was entitled to release on parole.

DISPOSITION: The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The Governor is hereby ordered to vacate his decision of June 23, 2008, which reversed the Board‘s July 2007 grant of parole. The Board‘s July 2007 grant of parole is reinstated. In the interests of justice, this opinion is made final as to this court seven days from the date of filing.

Full text http://www.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0310%2FA124814

Marsy's Law (Prop. 9) - where are we now?

2010-03-03T17:16:00.000-08:00

There has been several cases contesting Marsy's Law (Prop. 9). One of the trail blazer case was Gilman et al. V. Schwarzenegger et al. it raised several issues.

Unfortunately, for most lifers, it’s still a wait and see for any Ex Post Facto arguments under Prop 9.

Current Status:
- The District Judge dismissed the Lifer's Due Process claim against Proposition 9.

A preliminary injunction (PI) was granted to the specifically named plaintiffs. The State appealed. An argument in the circuit Court is set for April 13, 2010 to argue who else the preliminary injunction will apply to vis-a-vis inmates. The Order certifying the matter as a class action is pending on the state’s appeal. There is currently no stay on the Preliminary Injunction. The is no briefing scheduled yet. Let's keep an eye on this one!

There is ongoing discovery and of course the original action is on going based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which can be found in Title 42, section 1983, hence the well known name of the"1983" civil lawsuit.

We are all hoping for a win in the appeal of the class certification. This would allow to move for an expansion of the preliminary injunction to all class members !

(See our prior 2009 "Proposition 9" posting in this Blog)
Federal Defender (Eastern District) in Gilman et al. V. Schwarzenegger et al. (CIV-S-05-830 LKK GHH)

Eastern District with the UC Davis Law School of Civil Rights Clinic (Section 1983)
Lead Federal Public Defender: Monica Knox email: Monica_knox@fd.org

===== Other interesting cases on Ex Post Facto issues ============

In Thomas v. Yates (E.D. Cal. No. 05-1198) The District Judge has scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Governor's use of his reversal power under the 1988 initiative is Ex Post Facto when applied to Lifers whose offenses occurred before the date of enactment.

In Biggs v. Schwarzenegger (E.D. Cal. No. 07-470; 2009 WL 4048109) also in a challenge to the Governor's Parole power of Reversal, the Magistrate has granted the Lifer's motion for additional Discovery.

260 Inmates released in San Diego - per Federal Court Order

2010-02-01T16:16:00.000-08:00

California is under a federal court order to cut the number of inmates by 40,000 — from about 168,000 now — over several years to ease overcrowding and improve health care in the state’s 33 prisons.

The new Law took effect in January and had an immediate effect in San Diego County, where about 260 nonviolent offenders were released.

Statewide, corrections officials launched their plan to reduce the prison population by 6,500 inmates (this year's plan) and save the state more than $100 million over the next year. They said some of the revamped program’s elements will cut down on recidivism and allow parole agents to focus attention on more dangerous former convicts.

This is GREAT news..... EXCEPT that the LIFER inmate population will not be affected by this reduction. In addition, Non-Lifer Inmates jailed for serious or violent crimes, including burglaries, robberies and sexual assault will also be disqualified for release.

see Full news story
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jan/26/inmates-released-under-new-law/

December 23, 2009- A case to Watch! : Magistrate Order - Release on Parole immediately

2010-01-20T18:47:00.000-08:00

The Judge has not adopted the Magistrate's Recommendation, at this time.
*** This is a preliminary CASE to WATCH! ***
NOTE: The AG has objected and petitioner's reply is due 02-05-10.

Martinez v. Hartley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119255
December 23, 2009

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison after being convicted of second-degree murder in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Petitioner was committed to prison on September 8, 1987 with a minimum eligible parole date of September 7, 1997. The Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) granted Petitioner parole but the Governor of California reversed the grant.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court challenging the Governor's reversal on February 17, 2006. The court denied the petition on the basis that Petitioner's commitment offense alone was sufficient evidence on which the Governor could rely to reverse the grant. Petitioner filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. The appellate court denied the petition holding that there was "more than a 'modicum of evidence' to support the Governor's decision". The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment.

Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Federal - United States District Court claiming that his due process rights were violated when the Governor relied solely on the commitment offense to reverse Petitioner's grant of parole.

The Governor's reversal does mention the fact that Petitioner claimed that the killing was done in self defense until the 1990's but then goes on to note that Petitioner "has since then maintained that he accepts full responsibility and has remorse for [victim]'s murder." There is no evidence to support an inference that Petitioner is currently dangerous because he has not admitted the severity of or taken full responsibility for the murder. While the underlying offense may indeed have been grave, the standard by which the Governor must review the parole grant is whether Petitioner poses a current risk of danger to society, not whether he was dangerous at some point in the past--the Governor points to no evidence of the former.

Accordingly, because the Superior Court did not cite to a single fact in the record demonstrating Petitioner's current dangerousness, we find that the court unreasonably applied the clearly established "some evidence" standard. Furthermore, even if the Superior Court had articulated the correct standard, this Court finds no evidence in the record to support the Governor's finding that Petitioner poses a current risk of danger to society.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we find that the Petitioner is being held in violation of the Constitution and that the Superior Court's application of the "some evidence" standard is objectionably unreasonable.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1) Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED;

2) Petitioner should be released on parole immediately; and

3) The CDCR should be DIRECTED to credit the number of days from the date of the Governor's reversal (July 19, 2005) to the day Petitioner is released towards Petitioner's parole sentence.

MAIN ISSUE by the Magistrate: THE CRIME ALONE CAN NOT DENY PAROLE TO AN INMATE!

December 11, 2009 - Inmate's WHC granted to reinstate Parole Grant against Governor's reversal

2010-01-04T21:45:00.000-08:00

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant warden sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted respondent inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Governor's reversal of a Pen. Code, § 3040, decision from the California Board of Parole Hearings that had granted the inmate parole.

OVERVIEW: The inmate, who caused a fatal accident while driving under the influence, had no previous criminal record other than one adult conviction for driving under the influence. He was not subject to any disciplinary action while in prison, participated in self-help programs and therapy, and tutored other inmates. The superior court, upon concluding that the Governor's reversal of the parole decision was not supported by some evidence of danger to society and that the Governor's reconsideration would be futile, reinstated the board's decision. The court held that the order reinstating the decision did not divest the Governor of the right to review parole decisions under Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (b), and Pen. Code, § 3041.2, because the Governor had reviewed the decision. The Governor therefore was given a full opportunity to exercise the constitutional and statutory right of review. Remanding the matter to the Governor would be an idle act and would render meaningless the inmate's due process rights and the writ of habeas corpus. Because the warden did not provide analysis or authority to support a separation of powers argument, the court considered that claim of error forfeited.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order of the superior court.

In re Masoner, 179 Cal. App. 4th 1531 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2009)

Judges reject California plan to cut prison crowding

2009-11-12T17:56:00.000-08:00

Three federal judges on Wednesday forcefully rejected a Schwarzenegger administration proposal to ease prison overcrowding, threatening to impose their own plan for reducing the inmate population if the state does not submit an acceptable one within three weeks.

The panel said California officials had failed to comply with their order to produce a plan to pare the number of state prisoners by 40,000 within two years. The judges agreed to postpone a decision on a request by inmates' lawyers to hold Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in contempt of court for defying the earlier order, issued Aug. 4, 2009

A Schwarzenegger spokeswoman, Rachel Arrezola, said the state would respond to the order by its Nov. 12 deadline. She said the administration is continuing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court the judges' "arbitrary" reduction order. That appeal was filed last month.

The push to reduce overcrowding stems from the judges' ruling in a pair of inmate lawsuits. The judges said the teeming conditions of the state prison system, which contains nearly 170,000 people, is the main cause of medical and mental health care so poor that it violates the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

See: http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-prisons22-2009oct22,0,1269315.story

In re Cerny - filed 11/4/09, First District, Div. 3 ( 2009 SOS 6355)

2009-11-09T12:33:00.000-08:00

Finally another Federal case in the inmate's favor regarding the Parole Plan for release after being "branded" as a substance abuser. The crime and drug use was found to "remote" in time and could not be used against the inmate.
-----------------------------------------
SUMMARY:

Inmate’s inability to demonstrate a suitable plan for release may be the only factor that demonstrates his unsuitability for parole based on evidence of inmate’s extensive history of drug abuse and dependence. Parole board’s concern that inmate might revert to prior drug habits and thus become a danger to the public was justified. Circumstances of inmate’s commitment offense--a second-degree murder over a $60 drug deal gone bad 29 years ago while inmate was a chronic drug user--did not provide evidence that inmate’s release would unreasonably endanger the public, given close nexus between inmate’s history and drug abuse and the circumstances of his crime, the substantial amount of intervening time in which inmate has not committed any violent act or abused drugs, and defendant’s long-standing treatment for drug abuse. Inmate’s social and criminal history, which was inseparable from his history of addiction and drug abuse, were too far removed in time and behavioral attributes to constitute reliable evidence of inmate’s current dangerousness.

See: http://www.metnews.com/sos.cgi?1109%2FA122964

Englund v. Sisto, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99629 - grant

2009-11-05T08:01:00.000-08:00

Another win for the inmates in Federal Courts. The inmate had already served thirty years of a life sentence, nearly double the amount of time of either Biggs or Irons, when the Board denied him parole.

Thed Federal Court finds the Habeas relief is warranted and the Court GRANTS the Petition. IT IS HEREBY ORDERD that if Petitioner is incarcerated at this time, Respondent shall, within ten (10) days of this Order release Petitioner from custody.

==================================
Englund v. Sisto, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99629

Petitioner is the type of person the Ninth Circuit envisioned in Biggs and Iron whose liberty interest in parole could be at risk. Petitioner had already served thirty years of a life sentence, nearly double the amount of time of either Biggs or Irons, when the Board denied him parole. As in Biggs and Irons, the Board considered Petitioner a "model inmate." See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912. In fact, the Board admitted on the record that the section 2402 post-conviction factors weighed in favor of paroling Petitioner. It is significant that in denying Petitioner parole for one year, the Board did not advise Petitioner of what he could do to improve his chances of being paroled at his next parole suitability hearing.

In this regard, Petitioner has done everything California law requires him to do to gain parole after thirty years. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402. [*24] According to the Board, the only thing that prevents Petitioner from being paroled is his commitment offense; if the immutable facts of Petitioner's commitment are dispositive, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Board will again deny Petitioner parole the next time it considers his suitability for parole. This is precisely the scenario Ninth Circuit jurisprudence has sought to avoid. See Marshall, 512 F.3d at 545; see also Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; see also Irons, 505 F.3d at 854; see also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917.

Because Prisoner's behavior in custody for the past twenty years has been exemplary and substantially demonstrates rehabilitation, the Shasta County Superior Court's affirmation of the Board's decision thirty years after the commitment offense to deny Petitioner parole solely because of the nature of that offense was an unreasonable application of federal law.

CONCLUSION

"The Court finds that the Board of Prison Term's October 4, 2006, conclusion that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole violated Petitioner's right to due process and that the Shasta County Superior Court's Order affirming that denial constituted an unreasonable application [*25] of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Habeas relief is warranted and the Court GRANTS the Petition. IT IS HEREBY ORDERD that if Petitioner is incarcerated at this time, Respondent shall, within ten (10) days of this Order release Petitioner from custody.

IT IS SO ORDERED."

In re Phillips - Remedy when Court Orders new hearing?

2009-10-06T18:36:00.000-07:00

The In Re Phillips is a crucial case in that it addresses multiple BPH issue for the inmates.
Specifically one of the issue it deals with - WHAT remedy an inmate will receive from the Court once he has received an OSC?

In doing HC - Prayer normally follow a 3-prong approach similar to this:
1) Grant a new Hearing with the correct legal standard ( Lawrence/Shaputis)
2) Grant a new Hearing to set a Parole Date UNLESS new evidence show unstuitability
3) Grant a Hearing to set a Parole Date and release forthwith.

Different Courts have used different remedies. Hopefully this case will shed some light and consistency. Below are the minutes of the CA Supreme Court for this case.
=========================
August Supreme Court Minutes:

S173519 B215004 Second Appellate District, Div. 4 PHILLIPS (AHMAD) ON H.C.
Petition for review granted; transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, with directions to issue an order to show cause.

The petition for review is granted.

The matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four. That court is ordered to vacate its summary denial dated May 21, 2009, and is further ordered to issue an order to show cause, returnable before the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The Director of Corrections and Rehabilitation is to be ordered to show cause, when the matter is placed on calendar, why the Governor did not abuse his discretion in reversing the Board of Parole Hearings’ July 2008 determination that petitioner was suitable for parole, including his determination that petitioner lacked insight with respect to the commitment offense, and why the Board’s decision to grant parole should not be reinstated. (See In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181; In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1259-1260; In re Palermo (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1096.) The return is to be filed on or before September 11, 2009.

California to Submit a Plan to Relieve overcrowding with Safety

2009-09-22T19:48:00.000-07:00

"SACRAMENTO – The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) today will file a comprehensive plan with the federal three judge panel that reforms the prison system over several years and eventually could exceed the panel’s order to bring the operational capacity to 137.5 percent of combined design capacity of the state’s 33 prisons."
See http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2009_Press_Releases/Sept_18.html

============================================================
HOSPITAL CONCERNS: (El Centro Hospitals & CENTINELA prison)

"With 170,000 inmates, California's prison system is the largest in the U.S. and is dangerously overcapacity by about 190%. In February, a federal court demanded that the state reduce that population by 45,000, to 130,000, after finding that the correctional system could not provide adequate medical and mental health care to such a large number of prisoners.

Although the state has appealed that ruling, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger on Friday announced a more modest plan in an effort to appease that will reduce the inmate population by 18,212, in part with transfers to other state prisons and private facilities, commuted sentences, and early release of old and sick inmates."

SEE http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/239355/topic/WS_HLM2_LED/Sicker-Older-Inmates-May-Wind-up-on-California-Hospitals-Doorsteps.html

Proposition 9 (Marsy's Law) impact on Inmates

2009-09-21T00:58:00.000-07:00

The Impact of Proposition 9 (a.k.a. Marsy’s Law)
on Lifer Parole Suitability Hearings
Written by : Diane T. Letarte, MBA, LLM

WHAT IS Prop-9?:
On November 4, 2008, California voters were apparently swayed by emotion into passing Proposition 9, the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act (“Act”). While the proposition’s title is admittedly appealing and evokes understandable sympathy for the silent and defenseless, the Act’s actual language raises serious constitutional questions. California Penal Code 3041.5 , The Act simplistically treats ALL lifers equally, regardless of the individual facts or any extenuating circumstances. Additionally, the focus on Life Parole Hearings belies available research and leaves the misimpression as to the proportion and danger of the “Lifers” as parolees. Nevertheless, despite grave concerns, effective November 5, 2008, California Penal Code section 3041.5 is amended, increasing the parole-denial periods to which life prisoners could be subjected

The Act is comprised of five separate parts, apparently each section written in a manner intended to evoke an emotional response to gain support:

The first main part “preyed heavily n emotions, The strong undercurrent running through this section decries California’s criminal justice system because (1) it treats victims very poorly, (2) all past reform efforts failed to improve victims’ treatment; and (3) the parole system is too easy on criminals.

The second main part, Sections 4 and 4.1.,
purports to considerably expand victim’s rights, making them enforceable by victims and their lawyers.

The third main part of Proposition 9, its Sections 5 and 5.1 to 5.3,
concerns the rights of victims in the parole process; this third part substantially alters the parole process. The primary focus on the Lifer Parole Hearing process leaves the dubious impression that this prison population constitutes the largest threat.
The fourth main part of Proposition 9, at its Section 6, the “Notice of
Victim’s Bill of Rights,” concerns notifying victims of their rights.

The fifth main part deals mainly with conflicts, retroactivity, severability and amendment clauses.

Proposition 9 was procedurally implemented by the BPH on December 15, 2008 for the Lifer Parole Suitability Hearings.

WHAT PENAL CODE SECTIONS ARE IMPACTED?:

One undisputed consequence of the Act is to substantially extend prison time for those serving indeterminate sentences. Prior to Prop 9’s enactment, defendants plea bargained accepting certain universally accepted assumptions by all those associated with the conviction process only to discover fifteen years or more on that these “rules” have substantially changed.

Under the former Penal Code section 3041.5 life prisoners who were not convicted of murder could be denied parole for 1 or 2 years, and lifer prisoners who were convicted of murder could be denied parole for 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years. Under amended section 3041.5. ALL life prisoners can be denied parole 15, 10, 7, 5, or 3 years. Parole Hearing are now by default every 15-year after any hearing which a parole is denied, unless the BPH can show by “clear and convincing” evidence that the inmate does not require a more lengthy period of incarceration. If that evidence is shown, then the BPH may proceed to set the next denial in the order of 10, 7, 5, and finally 3-years based upon the same criteria.

Although numerous sections remain unchanged, there are two notable exceptions. Penal Code section 3041.5 sets forth the parole-grant hearing rights of prisoners. Penal Code section 3043 requires notice to the victim, and states other victim’s rights. These two sections are substantially amended by Prop 9. Additionally, Prop 9 adds new Section 3044 to the Penal Code, setting forth additional victim’s rights during the parole process.

LITIGATION EFFORTS:

Since the Act’s passage, serious constitutional concerns have been expressed concerning Proposition 9. At this time there are over 20 cases taken up on appeal via Writs directly from the unsuccessful Lifer Suitability Hearings. There are also three other known courts in which litigation has been filed on the early offset of Proposition 9 and they are seeking to enjoin implementation of Prop. 9’s anti-lifer provisions.

1. Rutterford/Lugo (case Amended for Prop. 9)
-Keith Whattley, esq. 220 4th St, ste 201 Oakland, CA 94607

2. Federal Defender (Eastern District) in Gilman et al. V. Schwarzenegger et al. (CIV-S-05-830 LKK GHH)
Federal Defender - Eastern District with the UC Davis Law School of Civil Rights Clinic (Section 1983)
-Monica Knox Monica_knox@fd.org

3. Taxpayers for improving Public Safety (Tips) v. Schwarzenegger et al. filed a civil lawsuit (12/2008) 34-2008-00030789-CU-JR-GDS (injunction relief).
-Steve Sanders, esq. 916-376-8738

SOME RELIEF:

On March 27, 2009, in the class action lawsuit involving LATE parole hearings (In re Rutherford, Marin County Superior Court NO Sc135399A) the BPH agreed that all the parole hearings that were due to be held prior to Proposition 9 on December 15, 2008 would now be entitled to “pre-9” hearing decision.

Voluntary waivers have not been modified by Proposition 9. In the California Code of Regulations (CCR): Title 15. Division 2, Chapter 3, Article 3, Section 2253 (15 CCR section 2253) Voluntary Waivers, Stipulations of Unsuitability, Postponements, and Continuances prisoners still have the right to Waivers. A prisoner may request to voluntarily waive his or her life parole consideration hearing for any reason. Request shall be made in writing to the Board and shall state the reason for the request. A prisoner may request to waive his or her hearing for 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years. A request made no later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing SHALL be PRESUMED to be valid.

These timeframes are very important and needs to be analyzed by an experienced attorney in this field. This tool can be used as a long term strategy to position your client in a better light at his next full Board hearing. If s/he is denied at the full hearing than the appropriate Writ of Habeas Corpus (WHC) can be filed in a timely manner with the appropriate issues raised, for appropriate Court relief.

On August 21, 2008, the California Supreme Court published its decisions in the cases of In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 and In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241. It provides more potential relief at the parole hearing for inmates that have been previously denied solely based on their immutable factors, one being the commitment offense.

A. In re Lawrence :

Inmates have a protected liberty interest in parole. Due process guarantees a meaningful judicial review and that the judicial standard of review for a BPH denial of parole and/or the Governor’s reversal of Parole Grant remains the “some evidence” standard of review.

Some clarification received by this case is that a denial (or reversal by the Governor) of a parole grant must be based on “an assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness. The commitment offense ALONE can not be used to deny parole UNLESS, there is a nexus between the immutable factors and the inmate’s current dangerousness. The unsuitability factors used at a Lifer parole hearing can be reviewed under 15 CCR §2402.

From a practical point, the attorney representing the inmates at their lifer parole hearing must make sure that they properly present all the positive (suitability) factors. These include but are not limited to: programming, vocational trades acquired, self-help classes completed, positive laudatory chronos received as well as all the AA/NA meeting attended. In addition, show the lack of CDC-115 (a.k.a. rules infraction as part of institutional behavior) on the inmate’s part during his period of incarceration. All these positive aspects will be needed to outweigh any unsuitability factors in order to be deemed suitable and not be deemed a current risk of danger to society.

The California Supreme Court approved the decision of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Biggs v. Terhune (2003) 336 F.3d 910. This is a federal landmark case in the Parole process.

B. In re Shaputis:

This is the companion case to Sandra Lawrence. Richard Shaputis appears to be the “take” portion of the “give and take” offered up by the California Supreme Court in August 2008 to demonstrate that its decision in Lawrence does not “open the flood gates” of parole for lifer inmates.

In reversing the appellate court’s grant of parole to Mr. Shaputis, the Supreme Court concluded that because of a “lack of insight” into the commitment offense and a pattern of “sometimes violent behavior,” the inmate continues (currently) to be an “unreasonable risk” to public safety.

From a practical standpoint, the attorneys representing Lifers will need to closely scrutinize any and all Psychological evidence presented at the parole hearings. The BPH has their own contracted Forensic Psychologists to interview the inmates in a non-confidential setting to provide a report and recommendation as to the risk of violence in society if the inmate is release. The inmate’s psychological evaluation is now being given more weight and on many occasions is used to eviscerate the insight previously gained by the inmates (by prior positive psychological evaluations) in order to shoehorn the In re Shaputis decision to BPH’s favor, for denying parole.

==================================================
LIFER HEARING PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS (making a record):

Attorneys representing Lifers at their Parole Suitability Hearing in the near future need to create the proper record that raises potentially appealable issues or serves as a basis for bringing a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Preliminary Objections recommended at the beginning of the Parole Suitability Hearing include the objections that new Proposition 9 violates the right to Confrontation, a.k.a. the 6th amendment rights, and the inmates’ Liberty interest in Parole, and others.

SUMMARY

While sympathetic to the emotional outrage felt by victims and their friends and family by crimes committed by recidivists, Proposition 9 unfairly targeted Lifers, a population which research supports as an extremely small and arguable less dangerous segment of the potential parole population. Not only has the Act failed to address the real objective of denying parole to truly dangerous criminals, its implementation violates constitutional guarantees, arguably constituting the greater danger to a free society.

Outside of the hearing itself, fervent opposition to the confirmation of new Commissioners that do not follow the law, are bias and/or unfair at the Parole Hearings must occur. The defense bar’s disapproval of retired law enforcement personnel’s disproportionate representation on the Board of Parole Hearings should be communicated to the Senate Committee on Rules in Sacramento.

We represent inmates at their Parole Revocation or Lifer Hearings and provide WHC relief, when appropriate. We successfully have released multiple Lifer inmates via the Parole Hearing Process, En Banc Hearings (in Sacramento) and via the Court system.
We have personally met (not represented) Mr. John Dannenburg (156 Cal. App. 4th 1387) and we discussed his struggles especially over the last 7 years in court (2002-2009) as a jailhouse lawyer. He was released 6 months ago from a 15-Life, 2nd degree murder sentence, he had served over 23 years. We also briefly spoke with Mr. Hayward (currently released) who is currently pending in the Federal Courts. Both are Landmark cases in this area of post-conviction law.

Welcome 2009

2009-09-12T20:55:00.000-07:00

Welcome to the Inmate Release Blog!

Attorneys, Paralegals, and x-inmates will post legal tips and thoughts on the current affairs in California as it relates to Lifer Parole Suitability Hearings and Appeals. Hopefully it will help you to ponder and work on your future stategy to assist the release of inmates.

We Welcome Your Comments!