People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224 (11/21/2025): A Court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny an expungement and reduction

 

Case Name: People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224,

Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 3, Opinion Date: 11/21/2025

In short, a court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny either an expungement and reduction under PC 1203.4 or a reduction to a misdemeanor under PC 17. PC 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and PC 17(f) prohibit using unpaid restitution as “grounds for denial,” and here the court emphasized the outstanding restitution in denying both forms of relief, requiring remand for reconsideration.

  

Introduction

The California Legislature, in enacting Senate Bill 1106, established a clear mandate: the inability to satisfy a restitution order must not serve as a barrier to rehabilitation or reentry. This principle is codified in Penal Code sections 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and 17(f), which explicitly state that unfulfilled restitution "shall not be grounds for denial" of a petition for expungement or reduction. Recently, in People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611, the Court of Appeal confirmed that this language plainly prohibits trial courts from relying on unpaid restitution as a basis for denying relief—not only as a sole factor but as any factor at all.  In Murphy, the court reversed a denial because the trial judge improperly weighed the defendant’s outstanding debt against their request for relief, holding that such consideration constitutes a legal error and an abuse of discretion. Consequently, because the Petitioner here has met all other statutory requirements, this Court must grant the requested relief without regard to any outstanding restitution balance.

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Key Legal References for Drafting a Motion on this Restitution point

Any attorney drafting a motion related to restitution should cite these specific sections and cases to strengthen the argument:

• People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611: The primary case holding that courts cannot use unpaid restitution "in any way" as a basis for denial.
• Penal Code § 1203.4(c)(3)(C): Prohibits denial of expungement due to unpaid restitution.⁶
• Penal Code § 17(f): Prohibits denial of a felony-to-misdemeanor reduction due to unpaid restitution.⁷
• Senate Bill 1106 (Stats. 2022, ch. 734): The legislative act that amended these codes to ensure that "expungement should be accessible to people who have been ordered to pay direct restitution."

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COURT CASE SUMMARY:  People v. Murphy 

 Hayley Mackenzie Murphy moved to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 (undesignated statutory references are to this code) and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.1 The trial court denied her motion. In her appeal, she contends the court erred by relying — despite language in section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(3)(C) (section 1203.4(c)(3)(C)) and section 17, subdivision (f) (section 17(f)) — on unpaid restitution to deny her requests. Those provisions provide that “an unfulfilled order of restitution” or “unpaid order of restitution” “shall not be grounds for denial” of such requests.

 

This language, she argues, plainly prohibits courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny requests for expungement and reduction. We agree and reverse.

  

DISPOSITION: 

The trial court’s order denying Murphy’s petition for relief under sections 1203.4 and 17 is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.

 

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EDITOR's NOTE: This may be an interesting case for arguments to put forth at a Parole Hearing for inmates that are being Denied a parole release for avoiding restitution. It would need to be a creative argument in front of the Board Of Parole Hearings (BPH).

 

FOR FULL OPINION: Note this link will eventually be obsolete from the Court. Download the case, to preserve the case on your device. There will be a Redirect Notice to this court website.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A172224.PDF

Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: Opinion Date: 10/27/2025 *** Do Not Be the Next LIFER: Don't Trade Holiday Cheer for a California Court Case

As the holiday season gets underway, bringing with it festive gatherings and celebratory toasts, every California driver must face a stark reality: getting behind the wheel while intoxicated carries a risk far greater than a simple DUI. If your choice to drink and drive results in a fatality, you could face not just a vehicular manslaughter charge, but a second-degree murder charge under the Watson doctrine—making you the next defendant in a California courtroom, potentially facing decades in state prison. Keep the roads safe, protect your future, and remember that for the sake of everyone, there is simply no excuse for impaired driving.

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Case Name: Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 4 DCA, Division: 1, Opinion Date: 10/27/2025

 The Court of Appeal affirms the lower court’s ruling that probable cause supports a murder charge where a motorcyclist died after striking defendant’s SUV minutes after it was rendered disabled on the freeway. The SUV became disabled due to an accident caused by defendant who had been driving while intoxicated. 

The court clarifies its decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499 and holds that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.

 

Summary of Nevarez v. Superior Court

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Factual Background

• Jose Haro Nevarez was driving while intoxicated and speeding (90–100 mph in a 65-mph zone) on an Interstate when he caused a multi-car collision.
• His vehicle, a Honda Pilot, became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane.
• Minutes later, a motorcyclist struck Nevarez's disabled SUV and was killed.
• Nevarez had a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit and had a prior DUI conviction, during which he received a Watson admonishment (warning him that driving under the influence could lead to a murder charge if someone was killed).

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Issue and Holding

• Issue: Did the fact that Nevarez was no longer actively driving at the moment of the motorcyclist's death preclude a charge of second-degree murder based on implied malice (People v. Watson)?
• Holding: The Court of Appeal denied Nevarez's petition to set aside the murder charge. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of probable cause for second-degree murder. Liability for murder under the Watson doctrine does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving, especially when the initial reckless driving and subsequent disabled vehicle are the proximate cause of the death.

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Key Legal Reasoning

• Implied Malice (Mens Rea): The court found probable cause for implied malice, citing the factors established in Watson:
1. A high Blood Alcohol Content (BAC).
2. Pre-drinking intent to drive.
3. Knowledge of the hazards of intoxicated driving (evidenced by the prior DUI and Watson admonishment).
4. Highly dangerous driving (excessive speeding).
• Proximate Cause (Actus Reus): The court found that Nevarez's drunk driving was the proximate cause of the motorcyclist's death. The fatal impact, which occurred just minutes after the initial crash, was a direct and foreseeable result of Nevarez's criminal act of driving while intoxicated and causing his car to become a disabled obstruction on a freeway.

Clarification of Chagolla: The court clarified its previous decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla), explaining that Chagolla did not create a rigid rule eliminating murder liability simply because the defendant was no longer actively driving. Instead, the focus remains on whether the defendant's conduct (driving while intoxicated) was the proximate cause of death and whether there is evidence of implied malice.

  

People v. Mills, Case #: B334998 (9/9/2025): Dismissing a strike so that a defendant might be eligible for elderly parole (EPED) is not a lawful reason to strike a strike

 

Some Elderly Law to keep in mind when reviewing the recent  People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 2 DCA, Division: 6, Opinion Date: 09/09/2025

 

In California, a person sentenced as a "two-striker" can be eligible for elderly parole, but under a different set of criteria than those not sentenced under the Three Strikes Law.

Here is a breakdown of the two programs:

1. Statutory Elderly Parole Program:

·       Eligibility: This program applies to inmates who are 50 years of age or older and have served at least 20 years of continuous incarceration on their current sentence.

·       Exclusion for Two-Strikers: Individuals sentenced under California's Three Strikes Law for a second or third strike are excluded from this statutory program.

2. Court-Ordered Elderly Parole Program:

·       Eligibility: This program, created by a federal court order, applies to inmates who are 60 years of age or older and have served a minimum of 25 years of continuous incarceration.

·       Inclusion for Two-Strikers: Unlike the statutory program, this court-ordered program does not exclude individuals sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. Therefore, a two-striker can be considered for parole under this program.

Key Differences and Considerations:

·       Age and Time Served: The two programs have different age and time-served requirements. A two-striker cannot access the earlier eligibility of 50 years of age and 20 years served. They must meet the criteria of 60 years of age and 25 years served.

·       Hearing Standards: At a parole suitability hearing for elderly parole, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) is required to give special consideration to factors such as the inmate's advanced age, time served, and any diminished physical condition. The central question remains whether the inmate poses a current, unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

 

     ================= NEW CASE LAW  ===========

 

Case Name: People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 2 DCA, Division: 6, Opinion Date: 09/09/2025

 Dismissing a strike so that a defendant might be eligible for elderly parole is not a lawful reason to remove a defendant from the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes rule or the fair import of People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The Court of Appeal states that [d]oing so here would work a radical exception to the Three Strikes rule. This would be the antithesis of judicial restraint.

Summary of the case People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, decided by the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6 on September 9, 2025:

·       Case Background: Jack Mills, a "three-strikes" offender, was originally sentenced to 110 years to life. A trial court later reduced his sentence to 43 years to life by striking one of his two "strikes." Mills, who is 67 years old, appealed, arguing that the trial court's decision was based on a mistaken belief that he would be eligible for "elderly parole" if one strike were eliminated. He contended that had the court known he was ineligible, it would have sentenced him differently, possibly by striking the remaining strike.

·       Elderly Parole Ineligibility: The court found that prisoners sentenced under the Three Strikes Law (specifically, under a provision of Penal Code § 3055) are not eligible for "elderly parole."

·       Appellate Court's Reasoning:

o   The court rejected Mills's argument that the trial court was confused about his parole eligibility. It noted that the trial court's comments were prefaced with "if," indicating an understanding of the conditions for parole.

o   The court stated that reversing the trial court's order based on speculation about what it might have done is not a proper basis for reversal.

o   The court held that dismissing a strike solely to make a defendant eligible for "elderly parole" is an unlawful reason and would be a "radical exception" to the Three Strikes rule, which would be an "antithesis of judicial restraint."

o   The court also commented on the horrific nature of Mills's crimes, which included a home invasion robbery and the attempted murder of a victim who was shot in the head at close range.

o   The court affirmed the judgment and did not order a remand for re-computation of credits, noting that this is a matter for prison officials, which the defendant can challenge in the trial court if necessary.

·       Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment, effectively denying Mills's appeal and upholding his 43-years-to-life sentence.