Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: Opinion Date: 10/27/2025 *** Do Not Be the Next LIFER: Don't Trade Holiday Cheer for a California Court Case

As the holiday season gets underway, bringing with it festive gatherings and celebratory toasts, every California driver must face a stark reality: getting behind the wheel while intoxicated carries a risk far greater than a simple DUI. If your choice to drink and drive results in a fatality, you could face not just a vehicular manslaughter charge, but a second-degree murder charge under the Watson doctrine—making you the next defendant in a California courtroom, potentially facing decades in state prison. Keep the roads safe, protect your future, and remember that for the sake of everyone, there is simply no excuse for impaired driving.

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Case Name: Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 4 DCA, Division: 1, Opinion Date: 10/27/2025

 The Court of Appeal affirms the lower court’s ruling that probable cause supports a murder charge where a motorcyclist died after striking defendant’s SUV minutes after it was rendered disabled on the freeway. The SUV became disabled due to an accident caused by defendant who had been driving while intoxicated. 

The court clarifies its decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499 and holds that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.

 

Summary of Nevarez v. Superior Court

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Factual Background

• Jose Haro Nevarez was driving while intoxicated and speeding (90–100 mph in a 65-mph zone) on an Interstate when he caused a multi-car collision.
• His vehicle, a Honda Pilot, became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane.
• Minutes later, a motorcyclist struck Nevarez's disabled SUV and was killed.
• Nevarez had a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit and had a prior DUI conviction, during which he received a Watson admonishment (warning him that driving under the influence could lead to a murder charge if someone was killed).

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Issue and Holding

• Issue: Did the fact that Nevarez was no longer actively driving at the moment of the motorcyclist's death preclude a charge of second-degree murder based on implied malice (People v. Watson)?
• Holding: The Court of Appeal denied Nevarez's petition to set aside the murder charge. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of probable cause for second-degree murder. Liability for murder under the Watson doctrine does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving, especially when the initial reckless driving and subsequent disabled vehicle are the proximate cause of the death.

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Key Legal Reasoning

• Implied Malice (Mens Rea): The court found probable cause for implied malice, citing the factors established in Watson:
1. A high Blood Alcohol Content (BAC).
2. Pre-drinking intent to drive.
3. Knowledge of the hazards of intoxicated driving (evidenced by the prior DUI and Watson admonishment).
4. Highly dangerous driving (excessive speeding).
• Proximate Cause (Actus Reus): The court found that Nevarez's drunk driving was the proximate cause of the motorcyclist's death. The fatal impact, which occurred just minutes after the initial crash, was a direct and foreseeable result of Nevarez's criminal act of driving while intoxicated and causing his car to become a disabled obstruction on a freeway.

Clarification of Chagolla: The court clarified its previous decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla), explaining that Chagolla did not create a rigid rule eliminating murder liability simply because the defendant was no longer actively driving. Instead, the focus remains on whether the defendant's conduct (driving while intoxicated) was the proximate cause of death and whether there is evidence of implied malice.

  

People v. Mills, Case #: B334998 (9/9/2025): Dismissing a strike so that a defendant might be eligible for elderly parole (EPED) is not a lawful reason to strike a strike

 

Some Elderly Law to keep in mind when reviewing the recent  People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 2 DCA, Division: 6, Opinion Date: 09/09/2025

 

In California, a person sentenced as a "two-striker" can be eligible for elderly parole, but under a different set of criteria than those not sentenced under the Three Strikes Law.

Here is a breakdown of the two programs:

1. Statutory Elderly Parole Program:

·       Eligibility: This program applies to inmates who are 50 years of age or older and have served at least 20 years of continuous incarceration on their current sentence.

·       Exclusion for Two-Strikers: Individuals sentenced under California's Three Strikes Law for a second or third strike are excluded from this statutory program.

2. Court-Ordered Elderly Parole Program:

·       Eligibility: This program, created by a federal court order, applies to inmates who are 60 years of age or older and have served a minimum of 25 years of continuous incarceration.

·       Inclusion for Two-Strikers: Unlike the statutory program, this court-ordered program does not exclude individuals sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. Therefore, a two-striker can be considered for parole under this program.

Key Differences and Considerations:

·       Age and Time Served: The two programs have different age and time-served requirements. A two-striker cannot access the earlier eligibility of 50 years of age and 20 years served. They must meet the criteria of 60 years of age and 25 years served.

·       Hearing Standards: At a parole suitability hearing for elderly parole, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) is required to give special consideration to factors such as the inmate's advanced age, time served, and any diminished physical condition. The central question remains whether the inmate poses a current, unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

 

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Case Name: People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 2 DCA, Division: 6, Opinion Date: 09/09/2025

 Dismissing a strike so that a defendant might be eligible for elderly parole is not a lawful reason to remove a defendant from the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes rule or the fair import of People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The Court of Appeal states that [d]oing so here would work a radical exception to the Three Strikes rule. This would be the antithesis of judicial restraint.

Summary of the case People v. Mills, Case #: B334998, decided by the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6 on September 9, 2025:

·       Case Background: Jack Mills, a "three-strikes" offender, was originally sentenced to 110 years to life. A trial court later reduced his sentence to 43 years to life by striking one of his two "strikes." Mills, who is 67 years old, appealed, arguing that the trial court's decision was based on a mistaken belief that he would be eligible for "elderly parole" if one strike were eliminated. He contended that had the court known he was ineligible, it would have sentenced him differently, possibly by striking the remaining strike.

·       Elderly Parole Ineligibility: The court found that prisoners sentenced under the Three Strikes Law (specifically, under a provision of Penal Code § 3055) are not eligible for "elderly parole."

·       Appellate Court's Reasoning:

o   The court rejected Mills's argument that the trial court was confused about his parole eligibility. It noted that the trial court's comments were prefaced with "if," indicating an understanding of the conditions for parole.

o   The court stated that reversing the trial court's order based on speculation about what it might have done is not a proper basis for reversal.

o   The court held that dismissing a strike solely to make a defendant eligible for "elderly parole" is an unlawful reason and would be a "radical exception" to the Three Strikes rule, which would be an "antithesis of judicial restraint."

o   The court also commented on the horrific nature of Mills's crimes, which included a home invasion robbery and the attempted murder of a victim who was shot in the head at close range.

o   The court affirmed the judgment and did not order a remand for re-computation of credits, noting that this is a matter for prison officials, which the defendant can challenge in the trial court if necessary.

·       Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment, effectively denying Mills's appeal and upholding his 43-years-to-life sentence.

People v. Jose Gelito Rodriguez (4/7/25): BEWARE: Statements via a Letter to the Board or CRA comments, on crime - admissible at Resentencing (PC 1172.6)

 

On April 7, 2025, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, issued a detailed opinion in the case of People v. Jose Gelito Rodriguez (Case No. B332704). The case concerned the denial of Rodriguez's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, a law that allows individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition for a new sentencing hearing.

Background of the Case

• Original Crime and Conviction: In 1982, Jose Rodriguez and three other individuals were involved in two separate shooting incidents on Hollywood Boulevard. The shootings resulted in the injury of one person, Don Hill, and the death of Kirk Bickford. Rodriguez was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and murder. In 1984, he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the associated firearm enhancements were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
• Plea Agreement Justification: The prosecutor at the time justified the plea agreement by stating that there were no independent witnesses to identify Rodriguez as the shooter. Furthermore, evidence from the preliminary hearing indicated that Rodriguez was under the influence of PCP at the time of the crime, which could have potentially supported a voluntary intoxication defense and reduced the charge to involuntary manslaughter. Rodriguez accepted the plea and was sentenced to 15 years to life.
• Petition for Resentencing: In a later petition, Rodriguez sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. He argued that he was not the actual shooter and that his intoxication at the time of the crime could have negated the malice required for a murder conviction, making him eligible for relief under the new law. The trial court found that Rodriguez had made a prima facie showing for relief and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.

The Evidentiary Hearing and Key Evidence

During the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented two key pieces of evidence to prove that Rodriguez was, in fact, the actual killer and not eligible for resentencing. Rodriguez objected to the admission of this evidence, arguing it was unreliable hearsay and that its use violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

1. 2011 Letter to the Board of Parole Hearings: In this letter, Rodriguez accepted "full and unequivocal responsibility for [his] actions in this crime" and expressed remorse, stating, "I had no right to end his life, an act for which I am truly and deeply sorry for committing." He also acknowledged that he had "took that away from anyone." Rodriguez objected to this letter, claiming it was inherently coercive because inmates are pressured to "accept responsibility" for their crimes during parole hearings.
2. 2016 Comprehensive Risk Assessment: This report, conducted by a psychologist named Dr. Hobel, contained a transcribed description of the crime from Rodriguez himself. In this description, Rodriguez stated: "I was in a moving car with three friends.... A guy came up, and I shot the gun.... Then two blocks later there was an argument with another guy. As we drove past him, I shot at him, but didn't see him go down." Rodriguez objected to this report, arguing it contained multiple levels of hearsay and was coerced by the psychologist in order to improve his chances for parole.

The trial court admitted both the letter and the report, concluding that they were not coerced and that they were admissible under the party admissions and public records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Based on this and other evidence, the court concluded that Rodriguez was the actual killer and denied his petition for resentencing.

The Appellate Court's Decision

Rodriguez appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the admission of his statements from the letter and the risk assessment report was an error. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision.

• Hearsay and Coercion: The appellate court rejected Rodriguez's arguments regarding hearsay and coercion. It held that the statements were properly admitted as party admissions. The court also found no evidence that the statements were coerced, noting that inmates are not required to admit guilt during parole hearings and that a refusal to do so cannot be held against them^.
• Fifth Amendment Rights: Crucially, the court also addressed Rodriguez's claim that the admission of his statements violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court held that the resentencing procedure under section 1172.6 is a post-conviction process, not a criminal trial. As a result, the Fifth Amendment does not apply in the same way, and a defendant's self-incriminating statements can be used at such a hearing.

In its detailed opinion, the appellate court found no error in the trial court's decision to admit the evidence and concluded that the trial court was correct in finding that Rodriguez was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.