12/6/2022 People v. E.M. Court’s jurisdiction to resentence under PC1172.1 was not eliminated by CDCR’s letter rescinding its request to recall the inmate’s sentence

Case Name: People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075 , District: 6 DCA , Case #: H049467 Opinion

A big thank you to CCAP for the summary of this 12/6/2022 case. Republish here for Education purpose.

Case Holding: 

Trial court’s jurisdiction to resentence an inmate under Penal Code section 1172.1 was not eliminated by CDCR’s letter rescinding its request to recall the inmate’s sentence, which was sent while the inmate’s appeal was pending. In 2019, CDCR recommended resentencing E.M. under what is now section 1172.1 based on Senate Bill No. 1393, which restored the trial court’s discretion to strike enhancements for prior serious felonies imposed under Penal Code section 667. After appointing counsel, the trial court declined to recall the sentence on the basis that E.M.’s judgment was final before the legislation was enacted (he was convicted in 1984). He appealed. 

The Attorney General initially agreed that E.M. case should be remanded for resentencing. However, after briefing, CDCR issued a new letter to the trial court stating it was rescinding its recommendation of recall and resentencing. The Attorney General withdrew its previous concession and argued the appeal was now moot. Held: Reversed and remanded. 

After a defendant has been committed to prison, the trial court may recall the defendant’s sentence and resentence him at any time based on the recommendation of the secretary of CDCR. After analyzing section 1172.1 and the legislative history, the Court of Appeal concluded CDCR’s rescission letter did not eliminate the trial court’s jurisdiction to recall and resentence E.M. and did not moot the appeal. The language of the statute implies the trial court’s power to recall continues indefinitely once it receives a recommendation from CDCR and there is no language that gives CDCR the power to rescind its recommendation. The trial court acted when it issued the order denying recall, and in doing so, the court exercised jurisdiction over the matter long before CDCR issued its rescission letter. Allowing CDCR to moot the appeal under the circumstances of this case would present separation of power concerns and it is it is unlikely the Legislature intended for CDCR to intrude this far into the courts’ jurisdiction over sentencing matters. 

[CCAP Editor’s Note: The Court of Appeal did not decide whether CDCR has the power to rescind a recommendation soon after issuing it and where the trial court has not yet acted on it; where a subsequent change in the prisoner’s circumstances may support rescission; or where the initial recommendation was erroneously issued due to administrative improvidence.] 

 The trial court erred in denying recall on the ground that a new law did not apply retroactively in a case that was final and remand is required for the trial court to consider recall and resentencing under section 1721.1. E.M. argued the trial court misconstrued the law when it denied recall and erred in several other ways based on the procedural requirements of newly enacted section 1172.1. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred. Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 1540 renumbered the recall and resentencing provisions of former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and amended the language governing the procedural requirements, which are now set forth in section 1172.1. Section 1172.1 provides in part, “The court, in recalling and resentencing under this subdivision, shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Pen. Code, § 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(4) sets forth a list of factors—some permissive and some mandatory—for the court to consider in recalling and resentencing. The statute includes a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing, which may only be overcome if the court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (c). (Pen. Code, § 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Even before the enactment of AB 1540, Courts of Appeal held that former section 1170, subdivision (d) allowed for recall and resentencing based on recent changes in law that would be ameliorative with respect to cases that were final on appeal. The court reviewed recent decisions addressing the two statutes and concluded the trial court erred by denying recall on the erroneous premise that SB 1393 did not apply to E.M.’s case. On remand, section 1721.1 will apply. 

 [CCAP Editor’s Note: The court declined to decide whether section 1172.1 controlled in this appeal or whether former section 1170, subdivision (d) applied. (Compare People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, with People v. Pillsbury (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 776, 782 and People v. Cepeda (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 456.) 

 

 The full opinion is available on the court’s website:

 https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H049467.PDF

California moves to shutdown a 3rd State prison --- CDCR (Prison and Yard Closures): California 2023

On December 6, 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) announced the closure of Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (CVSP) in 2025 and exiting of California City Correctional Facility (Cal City). 

CDCR will terminate the Cal City contract in March 2024 and end the use of that facility as a state prison. The state will not renew it's lease of the California City location, which is a leased facility, but staffed wholly by state employees, both free staff and CCPOA. 

The potential closure of several additional prisons was included in Governor Gavin Newsom’s 2022-23 budget with an eye toward fiscal responsibility. It is the third prison that Gov. Newsom’s administration has moved to shutdown. This is most likely because of California’s shrinking state prison inmate population. Shutting five State prisons would save $1.5 billion per year. 

POPULATION of California Inmates by year: 

2011 - 160,000 inmates 

2019 - 120,000 inmates 

2022 - so far we are at about 94,000 inmates. 

 

 CVSP will close by March 2025. 

CVSP Chuckawalla Valley State Prison is in the city of Blythe. It’s sister facility, Ironwood State Prison (ISP), literally next door on the same land span will stay open. 

There will be closure of YARDS at several other locations listed below: 

Folsom Women's Facility (small area of Old Folsom) closed by next month, January, 2023 

CMC-W, California Men's Colony in San Luis Obispo, west yard by winter of 2023 

PBSP-C yard, Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, winter of 2023 

CRC-A facility, California Rehabilitation Center, Norco, A yard, January 2023 

CIM-D facility, California Institute for Men, Chino, D yard, spring 2023 

CCI-D facility, California Correctional Institution, D yard, summer 2023 

Inmates will have to be transferred to other CDCR facilities. We hope this rapid movement toward reducing prisons doesn't bring us back to the overcrowding that brought a class action almost 10-years ago, over medical and mental health care.  

February 10, 2014, the Three-Judge Court ordered CDCR to reduce the in-state adult prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity.

10/18/2022 People v. Hardin: Youth Offender (under 26) with LWOP are still entitled to Franklin Hearing.

 

People v. Hardin , District: 2 DCA , Division: 7 , Case #: B315434 Opinion Date: 10/18/2022 

Case Holding: 

Denying a youth offender parole hearing to individuals sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed when they were between the ages of 18 and 25 violates equal protection.

 In 1990, Hardin, then 25 years of age, was convicted of special-circumstance felony murder and sentenced to LWOP. In 2021, Hardin filed a motion seeking to develop a record for an eventual youth offender parole hearing (a.k.a Franklin Hearing). The trial court denied the request, finding Hardin was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h). Hardin appealed, arguing that section 3051 violated his right to equal protection. 

Held: Reversed and remanded. 

An individual convicted of an offense committed when he was a young adult (25 years old or younger) and for which the sentence is LWOP, is not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (h)) or otherwise entitled to parole consideration. In contrast, an individual convicted of an offense committed when he was a young adult, and for which the sentence is an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, is eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing at the beginning of his 25th year of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3).) 

After analyzing section 3051 and relevant case law, the Court of Appeal concluded that young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP are similarly situated to all other young adult offenders for purposes of section 3051. The purpose of current section 3051 is that the distinctive attributes of youth, which mitigate culpability and offer the possibility of growth and change, apply equally to young adults up to age 25. Accordingly, there is no rational basis for the Legislature to exclude otherwise similarly situated offenders from a youth offender parole hearing based solely on the crime committed or the sentence imposed. 

Hardin is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing based on his right to equal protection and, as such, is also entitled to a hearing to assemble[Fn.1] information concerning his youth-related mitigating factors. 

 DISPOSITION
The order denying Hardin’s motion for a Franklin hearing is reversed. The cause is remanded with directions to schedule the hearing and to conduct all appropriate further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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Fn1: 

Recognizing that gathering information on youth-related mitigating factors for a youth offender parole hearing is a task more easily accomplished at the time of sentencing rather than decades later at a parole hearing, the Supreme Court in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284 held a defendant eligible for such a hearing must be permitted at the time of sentencing to make a record of those factors, a proceeding that has since  become known as a Franklin proceeding. The Court in In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458 held a juvenile offender with a final judgment could move in a postjudgment proceeding under section 1203.01 (rather than through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus) to present evidence of youth-related factors.
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NOTE:  The Court of Appeal concluded that distinguishing between juvenile and young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP does not violate equal protection. (2) The court noted that the Legislature may decide the youth parole eligibility date for a young adult sentenced to LWOP should be different from the 25th year of incarceration.]

The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B315434.PDF 

 

- Thank you for CCAP's summary of the HARDIN case.