LIFER PAROLEE: Can Parolees (Lifers) be remanded to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) on a Parole Violation (PV) or not and thus be remanded and eligible to punishments like other Parole Violations?
It depends – see People v. Reed (2024) and People v. Batten (2025).
BOTH Case Summaries:
People v. Reed (2024):
The trial court entered orders revoking defendant's three-year term of parole and remanding him to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for purposes of future parole consideration pursuant to Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h). (Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, Nos. CT22000854 and CRI2527813, Russell S. Roeca, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the orders remanding defendant to CDCR custody and the jurisdiction of the BPH. The court concluded that, in light of Pen. Code, § 3000.01, the provisions of Pen. Code, § 3000.1, did not apply to defendant. Given that, by its plain language, the mandatory remand-to-CDCR-custody provision (Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h)) is triggered if § 3000.1 applies, the court further concluded § 3000.08, subd. (h), did not apply to defendant. Therefore, the trial court erred by remanding defendant to the custody of CDCR and the jurisdiction of the BPH pursuant to § 3000.08, subd. (h). Because § 3000.08, subd. (h), was not applicable to defendant, once he was found in violation of parole it was for the trial court to modify or revoke parole pursuant to its authority as set forth in § 3000.08, subds. (f), (g). (Opinion by Petrou, J., with Fujisaki, Acting P. J., and Rodríguez, J., concurring.)
(People v. Reed (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 43, 43 [322 Cal.Rptr.3d 703].)
--------------------------------
People v. Batten, (2025)
Case #: A169597, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 4, Opinion Date: 03/17/2025
The Court of Appeal holds that the disparity in treatment of those released on parole prior to July 2020 and those released after July 2020 does not violate equal protection under the rational basis test. Defendant was released on lifetime parole in 2017 after serving a term for murder. In 2023, defendant was found in violation of parole and was remanded to the custody of CDCR under PC 3000.08. Under PC 3000.01, enacted in 2020, those convicted of murder but released on parole after July 2020 would have been placed on parole for only three years and would have been eligible for punishments other than mandatory remand to the CDCR.
HOLDINGS: [1]-Rational basis review applies with respect to a disparity between the mandatory remand provision for a parole violation in Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h), and the alternative sanctions provision under § 3000.8, subds. (f) & (g). Although defendant contended it was irrational to remand her to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for her two admitted parole violations (driving under the influence and failing to inform her parole agent of her arrest), the court found that defendant's arguments invited it to perform the type of second-guessing of policy choices that rational basis review is designed to avoid. The Legislature could have rationally decided not to invalidate the parole board's reasoning retroactively by freeing all existing parolees like defendant from the mandatory remand provision.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the People that rational basis review applies and that there is a rational basis to treat the two groups of inmates differently.
(People v. Batten (Mar. 17, 2025, No. A169597) ___Cal.App.5th___ [2025
Cal. App. LEXIS 164, at *1].)
The full opinion is normally available on the courts website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169597.PDF
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pen. Code, §§ 1203.2 and 3000.08, establish the statutory framework for parole revocation proceedings.
Historically, responsibility for parole revocation rested with the Board of Parole Hearings. In 2012, the Legislature amended Pen. Code, § 1203.2, to incorporate parole into the statutes governing revocation of other types of statutory supervision, shifting jurisdiction over most parole revocation petitions to the superior courts. Currently, Pen. Code, §§ 1203.2 and 3000.08, establish the statutory framework for parole revocation proceedings. Upon a finding that a parolee has violated the conditions of parole, a trial court generally has the discretion to modify or revoke parole, including the authority to sentence the person to county jail for up to 180 days, or refer the person to a reentry court or other evidence-based program. § 3000.08, subds. (f) & (g). However, once a court finds that a lifetime parolee has violated conditions of parole or the law, a special rule applies and those options do not exist. In such cases (lifetime parole), § 3000.08, subd. (h), is triggered, which requires the court to revoke parole and remand the parolee to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation custody.
Pen. Code, § 3000.1, sets out a term of lifetime parole for two groups of inmates: (1) those sentenced under Pen. Code, § 1168, for any offense of first or second degree murder with a maximum term of life imprisonment; and (2) certain sex offenders sentenced to a life term. § 3000.1, subd. (a). Section 3000.1 was last amended in 2014. In 2020, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 118, which implemented Pen. Code, § 3000.01. Section 3000.01 governs the periods of parole for persons who are subject to supervision under § 3000.08, and were released from state prison on or after July 1, 2020. 3000.01, subd. (a). Section 3000.01—"except as provided in subdivision (d) and notwithstanding any other law"—limits parole terms to three years for inmates serving a life sentence. § 3000.01, subd. (b). Section 3000.01, subd. (d), sets out only two exceptions: (1) if the underlying offense requires registration as a sex offender, and (2) if the parole term at the time of the commission of the offense was shorter than the terms in § 3000.01, subd. (b). § 3000.01, subd. (d)
Pen. Code, § 3000.01, states that it applies "notwithstanding any other law," which suggests the Legislature intended this section to take precedence over any conflicting provisions. § 3000.01, subd. (b). It is true that, despite adding § 3000.01 limiting the parole term for those released from prison on or after July 1, 2020, the Legislature did not amend the relevant provisions of statutes that provide for longer parole terms, such as Pen. Code, §§ 3000, 3000.08, and 3000.1. But while these statutory inconsistencies put trial courts in a bit of a conundrum when advising of the parole term, every appellate court to consider the issue has concluded the term limits in § 3000.01 override conflicting preexisting provisions.
For persons sentenced to life for murder who were released on parole on or after July 1, 2020, Pen. Code, §§ 3000.01 and 3000.1, impose conflicting terms of parole. Hence, only one of the two statutes can control, and the Legislature signaled its intent for the later-enacted statute—§ 3000.01—to preempt the conflicting, preexisting statute by including "notwithstanding any other law" in § 3000.01, subd. (b).
While a parolee who is no longer subject to
mandatory remand under Pen.
Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h), may be punished only as provided in §
3000.08, subds. (f) & (g),
for any parole violation, Pen.
Code, §§ 3000.01 and 3000.1,
in no way alter or limit the ability of the appropriate prosecuting agency
to seek new criminal charges predicated upon the conduct that led to the
violation of parole.
