In re Thai, CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 4, (12/16/2025): (YPED) Youth educational merit credits vs "other" MEPD credits are Distinct scheme and lawful

 Case Name: In re Thai, Case #: A170701, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 4, Opinion Date: 12/16/2025

CDCR’s regulation allowing only educational merit credits to advance a youth offender’s youth parole eligible date (YPED), while permitting additional credit categories to advance the minimum parole eligibility date (MPED) of non youth indeterminately sentenced prisoners (ISL), is lawful and constitutional. Youth offender parole under PC 3051 and adult indeterminate parole under PC 3041 are distinct statutory schemes with separate definitions.

Additionally, applying rational basis review, the court found no equal protection violation related to the disparate treatment.

In California law, the case In re Hieu Ho Trong Thai (First Appellate District, Division Four, Case No. A170701) is a 2025 decision that addresses prisoner rights and parole eligibility, specifically focusing on the application of "conduct credits" for youth offenders.

Summary of In re Hieu Ho Trong Thai (2025)

The case involves Hieu Ho Trong Thai, who was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for a murder committed when he was under age 26.

The Core Conflict:

Thai challenged the way the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) calculates the "Youth Parole Eligible Date" (YPED). Under California’s "Youth Offender" laws (Penal Code § 3051), younger inmates are entitled to an accelerated parole hearing.

Thai argued that he should be allowed to use all categories of prison conduct credits—such as work credits and good-behavior credits—to move his parole date even earlier. The CDCR regulations, however, only allowed "Educational Merit Credits" (credits for getting a degree or diploma) to advance a youth parole date.

The Court’s Ruling:

The First Appellate District, Division Four, ruled against Thai, holding that the state's credit system is legally and constitutionally sound.

• Rational Basis: The court found that the government had a "rational basis" for treating youth offenders differently than other inmates when it comes to credits.
• Administrative Efficiency: The court noted that because the youth parole scheme already provides an "accelerated" path to a hearing, the CDCR has a legitimate interest in keeping the credit system simple and focused on educational goals for younger inmates.
• Equal Protection: The court rejected Thai’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated, stating that the distinction between "youth offenders" and "non-youth offenders" does not require the same exact credit calculations for both groups.

 

EDITOR'S comment below:

Here are some points that could be used to counter the court's ruling:

In the case In re Thai (2025), the 1st Appellate District, Division Four, applied a "rational basis" review to deny Hieu Ho Trong Thai’s equal protection claim. To counter this ruling, a legal argument would typically need to demonstrate that the distinction between "youth offenders" and "other inmates" is either irrational or that it infringes upon a fundamental right requiring stricter scrutiny.

1. Failure of the "Stated Purpose" (The Rationality Gap)

The primary purpose of Penal Code § 3051 (the youth offender law) is to recognize the "diminished culpability" of youth and their "increased capacity for change."

• The Counter-Argument: By denying youth offenders the same conduct credits available to older inmates, the state creates a system where a youth offender—who the law admits is more capable of change—has fewer incentives and tools to demonstrate that change than a more mature offender. This contradicts the Legislature’s own stated goal of encouraging youthful rehabilitation.

2. Irrational Distinction Between Similarly Situated Inmates

The court ruled that "administrative efficiency" justifies the difference in credit systems.

• The Counter-Argument: Both youth offenders and non-youth offenders are "similarly situated" in that both are serving indeterminate life sentences and are seeking to demonstrate fitness for parole. There is no logical reason why a specific type of labor or good conduct should advance the "Minimum Eligible Parole Date" (MEPD) for an older adult but not the "Youth Parole Eligible Date" (YPED) for a younger one. Administrative convenience is rarely a sufficient justification for disparate treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.

3. The "Educational Merit" Fallacy

The current regulations only allow Educational Merit Credits to advance a youth's parole date.

• The Counter-Argument: This creates an elitist and narrow definition of rehabilitation. An inmate who performs essential prison labor or maintains a perfect disciplinary record (conduct credits) is demonstrating "growth and maturity" just as much as one who earns a GED. Limiting credits to academics ignores the multifaceted nature of rehabilitation defined in People v. Caballero and Miller v. Alabama.

4. Violation of the "Meaningful Opportunity for Release"

Under the 8th Amendment and the California Constitution, youth offenders must be given a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release."

• The Counter-Argument: If a youth offender is blocked from using conduct credits that are standard for the general population, their opportunity for release is not "meaningful"—it is structurally hindered. This creates a "de facto" harsher sentence for a class of people (youth) that the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly stated should be treated with more leniency.

5. Inconsistency with People v. Briscoe (2024)

Recent California case law (People v. Briscoe) has started to strike down "irrational distinctions" in § 3051.

• The Counter-Argument: Briscoe found it unconstitutional to treat youth offenders differently based on which specific statute they were sentenced under if their conduct was identical. The same logic applies here: you cannot treat two people with identical conduct records differently just because one is classified as a "youth offender" and the other is not. 

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The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170701.PDF

   

 

People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224 (11/21/2025): A Court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny an expungement and reduction

 

Case Name: People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224,

Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 3, Opinion Date: 11/21/2025

In short, a court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny either an expungement and reduction under PC 1203.4 or a reduction to a misdemeanor under PC 17. PC 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and PC 17(f) prohibit using unpaid restitution as “grounds for denial,” and here the court emphasized the outstanding restitution in denying both forms of relief, requiring remand for reconsideration.

  

Introduction

The California Legislature, in enacting Senate Bill 1106, established a clear mandate: the inability to satisfy a restitution order must not serve as a barrier to rehabilitation or reentry. This principle is codified in Penal Code sections 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and 17(f), which explicitly state that unfulfilled restitution "shall not be grounds for denial" of a petition for expungement or reduction. Recently, in People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611, the Court of Appeal confirmed that this language plainly prohibits trial courts from relying on unpaid restitution as a basis for denying relief—not only as a sole factor but as any factor at all.  In Murphy, the court reversed a denial because the trial judge improperly weighed the defendant’s outstanding debt against their request for relief, holding that such consideration constitutes a legal error and an abuse of discretion. Consequently, because the Petitioner here has met all other statutory requirements, this Court must grant the requested relief without regard to any outstanding restitution balance.

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Key Legal References for Drafting a Motion on this Restitution point

Any attorney drafting a motion related to restitution should cite these specific sections and cases to strengthen the argument:

• People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611: The primary case holding that courts cannot use unpaid restitution "in any way" as a basis for denial.
• Penal Code § 1203.4(c)(3)(C): Prohibits denial of expungement due to unpaid restitution.⁶
• Penal Code § 17(f): Prohibits denial of a felony-to-misdemeanor reduction due to unpaid restitution.⁷
• Senate Bill 1106 (Stats. 2022, ch. 734): The legislative act that amended these codes to ensure that "expungement should be accessible to people who have been ordered to pay direct restitution."

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COURT CASE SUMMARY:  People v. Murphy 

 Hayley Mackenzie Murphy moved to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 (undesignated statutory references are to this code) and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.1 The trial court denied her motion. In her appeal, she contends the court erred by relying — despite language in section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(3)(C) (section 1203.4(c)(3)(C)) and section 17, subdivision (f) (section 17(f)) — on unpaid restitution to deny her requests. Those provisions provide that “an unfulfilled order of restitution” or “unpaid order of restitution” “shall not be grounds for denial” of such requests.

 

This language, she argues, plainly prohibits courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny requests for expungement and reduction. We agree and reverse.

  

DISPOSITION: 

The trial court’s order denying Murphy’s petition for relief under sections 1203.4 and 17 is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.

 

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EDITOR's NOTE: This may be an interesting case for arguments to put forth at a Parole Hearing for inmates that are being Denied a parole release for avoiding restitution. It would need to be a creative argument in front of the Board Of Parole Hearings (BPH).

 

FOR FULL OPINION: Note this link will eventually be obsolete from the Court. Download the case, to preserve the case on your device. There will be a Redirect Notice to this court website.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A172224.PDF

Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: Opinion Date: 10/27/2025 *** Do Not Be the Next LIFER: Don't Trade Holiday Cheer for a California Court Case

As the holiday season gets underway, bringing with it festive gatherings and celebratory toasts, every California driver must face a stark reality: getting behind the wheel while intoxicated carries a risk far greater than a simple DUI. If your choice to drink and drive results in a fatality, you could face not just a vehicular manslaughter charge, but a second-degree murder charge under the Watson doctrine—making you the next defendant in a California courtroom, potentially facing decades in state prison. Keep the roads safe, protect your future, and remember that for the sake of everyone, there is simply no excuse for impaired driving.

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Case Name: Nevarez v. Superior Court, Case #: D085897, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 4 DCA, Division: 1, Opinion Date: 10/27/2025

 The Court of Appeal affirms the lower court’s ruling that probable cause supports a murder charge where a motorcyclist died after striking defendant’s SUV minutes after it was rendered disabled on the freeway. The SUV became disabled due to an accident caused by defendant who had been driving while intoxicated. 

The court clarifies its decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499 and holds that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.

 

Summary of Nevarez v. Superior Court

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Factual Background

• Jose Haro Nevarez was driving while intoxicated and speeding (90–100 mph in a 65-mph zone) on an Interstate when he caused a multi-car collision.
• His vehicle, a Honda Pilot, became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane.
• Minutes later, a motorcyclist struck Nevarez's disabled SUV and was killed.
• Nevarez had a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit and had a prior DUI conviction, during which he received a Watson admonishment (warning him that driving under the influence could lead to a murder charge if someone was killed).

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Issue and Holding

• Issue: Did the fact that Nevarez was no longer actively driving at the moment of the motorcyclist's death preclude a charge of second-degree murder based on implied malice (People v. Watson)?
• Holding: The Court of Appeal denied Nevarez's petition to set aside the murder charge. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of probable cause for second-degree murder. Liability for murder under the Watson doctrine does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving, especially when the initial reckless driving and subsequent disabled vehicle are the proximate cause of the death.

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Key Legal Reasoning

• Implied Malice (Mens Rea): The court found probable cause for implied malice, citing the factors established in Watson:
1. A high Blood Alcohol Content (BAC).
2. Pre-drinking intent to drive.
3. Knowledge of the hazards of intoxicated driving (evidenced by the prior DUI and Watson admonishment).
4. Highly dangerous driving (excessive speeding).
• Proximate Cause (Actus Reus): The court found that Nevarez's drunk driving was the proximate cause of the motorcyclist's death. The fatal impact, which occurred just minutes after the initial crash, was a direct and foreseeable result of Nevarez's criminal act of driving while intoxicated and causing his car to become a disabled obstruction on a freeway.

Clarification of Chagolla: The court clarified its previous decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla), explaining that Chagolla did not create a rigid rule eliminating murder liability simply because the defendant was no longer actively driving. Instead, the focus remains on whether the defendant's conduct (driving while intoxicated) was the proximate cause of death and whether there is evidence of implied malice.