The New Frontier of Mercy: AB 960, In re Hoze, and the End of "Death by Incarceration"

 For decades, California’s "Compassionate Release" program was widely considered a failure. Incarcerated people with terminal illnesses or permanent incapacitation often died while waiting for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to process their paperwork. Between 2015 and 2021, nearly a third of all applicants died before they could even reach a judge.

However, the legal landscape in 2026 has fundamentally shifted. Through the implementation of AB 960 (Penal Code § 1172.2) and the clarifying precedent of In re Hoze, California has finally created a "safety valve" that prioritizes human dignity and medical reality over rigid sentencing.

In the landmark case In re Hoze (2021), the California Court of Appeal addressed a critical bottleneck in the Elderly Parole Program (PC § 3055): the treatment of "Thompson Terms," or consecutive sentences for crimes committed while in prison. The court ruled that when the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) determines an elderly inmate is suitable for parole, that finding applies to the individual's entire period of incarceration, effectively superseding the requirement to serve additional consecutive time for in-prison conduct. This decision transformed the Elderly Parole Program from a partial remedy into a meaningful pathway for release, ensuring that elderly individuals deemed a low risk to public safety are not kept behind bars on technical sentencing "stacking" that contradicts the rehabilitative and compassionate intent of the law.

The Power of the Presumption: AB 960 (PC § 1172.2)

The most revolutionary aspect of AB 960 is the mandatory presumption of release. Under the old law, the CDCR Secretary had the power to block a referral before it ever reached a courtroom. Now, the law requires that if a Chief Medical Executive (CME) finds an inmate meets the medical criteria, the case must be referred to the sentencing court.

Once in court, the burden of proof flips. The judge must grant the recall and resentencing unless the District Attorney can prove that the individual poses an "unreasonable risk of danger of committing a Super Strike felony."

Key takeaway: A "Super Strike" is a very narrow list of violent crimes (like murder or certain sex offenses). Most elderly or medically incapacitated inmates—even those with high-level original convictions—simply do not possess the physical ability to commit these specific acts, making the DA's burden almost impossible to meet in many cases.

The "Hoze" Factor: Overcoming the Consecutive Sentence Barrier

One of the most significant hurdles for elderly parole candidates has been the "Thompson Term"—a consecutive sentence for a crime committed while in prison (such as possession of a weapon). For years, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) would find an inmate "suitable" for parole under the Elderly Parole Program (PC § 3055), only to tell them they had to stay in prison for another five years to serve their in-prison offense.

The landmark case In re Hoze (2021), followed by subsequent 2024-2025 appellate clarifications, changed this. The court ruled that the Elderly Parole Program was intended to bring immediate relief. When the BPH finds a person suitable for elderly parole, that suitability finding overrides the requirement to serve a consecutive Thompson Term.

This is a vital "hook"--->: If an inmate is old enough or sick enough to be paroled, they are too old or too sick for their "consecutive" past to keep them in a cage.

---

Countering the Opposition: Arguments to Favor Compassionate Release

When a District Attorney (DA) opposes a compassionate release referral, they typically rely on two arguments: "Public Safety" and "Truth in Sentencing." Here is how to legally dismantle those claims:

1. The "Recidivism is Science" Argument

DAs often point to the nature of the original crime to argue the person is dangerous.

• The Counter: Under AB 960, the court is legally required to look at the current physical and mental condition of the person. If an individual requires assistance with "Activities of Daily Living" (bathing, dressing, toileting), they are statistically and physically incapable of recidivism. In fact, federal data shows the recidivism rate for compassionate releases is roughly 3.5%, compared to nearly 40% for the general population. NOTE: [The 3.5% recidivism rate for compassionate releasees was first officially documented in the 2013 OIG report, The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Compassionate Release Program]

2. The "Constitutional Duty" Argument

DAs may argue that release is a "gut punch" to victims and violates the original intent of the sentence.

• The Counter: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Plata that California cannot ignore the medical needs of prisoners. Incarcerating a dying person who requires 24-hour care is not "justice"—it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Compassionate release is a constitutional necessity, not a "loophole."

3. The "Fiscal Responsibility" Argument

When the District Attorneys argue that the cost of incarceration should not influence justice, they ignore a fundamental reality of public governance: Every dollar spent guarding a hospital bed is a dollar stolen from active public safety. In many cases, the state is spending over $150,000 per year to keep a single medically incapacitated person in a prison infirmary.

• The Counter: Releasing these individuals to community-based care or family custody shifts the burden to more efficient systems (like Medicare) and frees up resources for actual public safety initiatives.

---

Conclusion:

AB 960 is a mandate, not a suggestion. By combining the medical presumptions of the new law with the "immediate release" precedent of In re Hoze, we can ensure that the "elderly and infirm" are no longer the fastest-growing population in our prisons.

 

In re Thai, CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 4, (12/16/2025): (YPED) Youth educational merit credits vs "other" MEPD credits are Distinct scheme and lawful

 Case Name: In re Thai, Case #: A170701, Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 4, Opinion Date: 12/16/2025

CDCR’s regulation allowing only educational merit credits to advance a youth offender’s youth parole eligible date (YPED), while permitting additional credit categories to advance the minimum parole eligibility date (MPED) of non youth indeterminately sentenced prisoners (ISL), is lawful and constitutional. Youth offender parole under PC 3051 and adult indeterminate parole under PC 3041 are distinct statutory schemes with separate definitions.

Additionally, applying rational basis review, the court found no equal protection violation related to the disparate treatment.

In California law, the case In re Hieu Ho Trong Thai (First Appellate District, Division Four, Case No. A170701) is a 2025 decision that addresses prisoner rights and parole eligibility, specifically focusing on the application of "conduct credits" for youth offenders.

Summary of In re Hieu Ho Trong Thai (2025)

The case involves Hieu Ho Trong Thai, who was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for a murder committed when he was under age 26.

The Core Conflict:

Thai challenged the way the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) calculates the "Youth Parole Eligible Date" (YPED). Under California’s "Youth Offender" laws (Penal Code § 3051), younger inmates are entitled to an accelerated parole hearing.

Thai argued that he should be allowed to use all categories of prison conduct credits—such as work credits and good-behavior credits—to move his parole date even earlier. The CDCR regulations, however, only allowed "Educational Merit Credits" (credits for getting a degree or diploma) to advance a youth parole date.

The Court’s Ruling:

The First Appellate District, Division Four, ruled against Thai, holding that the state's credit system is legally and constitutionally sound.

• Rational Basis: The court found that the government had a "rational basis" for treating youth offenders differently than other inmates when it comes to credits.
• Administrative Efficiency: The court noted that because the youth parole scheme already provides an "accelerated" path to a hearing, the CDCR has a legitimate interest in keeping the credit system simple and focused on educational goals for younger inmates.
• Equal Protection: The court rejected Thai’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated, stating that the distinction between "youth offenders" and "non-youth offenders" does not require the same exact credit calculations for both groups.

 

EDITOR'S comment below:

Here are some points that could be used to counter the court's ruling:

In the case In re Thai (2025), the 1st Appellate District, Division Four, applied a "rational basis" review to deny Hieu Ho Trong Thai’s equal protection claim. To counter this ruling, a legal argument would typically need to demonstrate that the distinction between "youth offenders" and "other inmates" is either irrational or that it infringes upon a fundamental right requiring stricter scrutiny.

1. Failure of the "Stated Purpose" (The Rationality Gap)

The primary purpose of Penal Code § 3051 (the youth offender law) is to recognize the "diminished culpability" of youth and their "increased capacity for change."

• The Counter-Argument: By denying youth offenders the same conduct credits available to older inmates, the state creates a system where a youth offender—who the law admits is more capable of change—has fewer incentives and tools to demonstrate that change than a more mature offender. This contradicts the Legislature’s own stated goal of encouraging youthful rehabilitation.

2. Irrational Distinction Between Similarly Situated Inmates

The court ruled that "administrative efficiency" justifies the difference in credit systems.

• The Counter-Argument: Both youth offenders and non-youth offenders are "similarly situated" in that both are serving indeterminate life sentences and are seeking to demonstrate fitness for parole. There is no logical reason why a specific type of labor or good conduct should advance the "Minimum Eligible Parole Date" (MEPD) for an older adult but not the "Youth Parole Eligible Date" (YPED) for a younger one. Administrative convenience is rarely a sufficient justification for disparate treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.

3. The "Educational Merit" Fallacy

The current regulations only allow Educational Merit Credits to advance a youth's parole date.

• The Counter-Argument: This creates an elitist and narrow definition of rehabilitation. An inmate who performs essential prison labor or maintains a perfect disciplinary record (conduct credits) is demonstrating "growth and maturity" just as much as one who earns a GED. Limiting credits to academics ignores the multifaceted nature of rehabilitation defined in People v. Caballero and Miller v. Alabama.

4. Violation of the "Meaningful Opportunity for Release"

Under the 8th Amendment and the California Constitution, youth offenders must be given a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release."

• The Counter-Argument: If a youth offender is blocked from using conduct credits that are standard for the general population, their opportunity for release is not "meaningful"—it is structurally hindered. This creates a "de facto" harsher sentence for a class of people (youth) that the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly stated should be treated with more leniency.

5. Inconsistency with People v. Briscoe (2024)

Recent California case law (People v. Briscoe) has started to strike down "irrational distinctions" in § 3051.

• The Counter-Argument: Briscoe found it unconstitutional to treat youth offenders differently based on which specific statute they were sentenced under if their conduct was identical. The same logic applies here: you cannot treat two people with identical conduct records differently just because one is classified as a "youth offender" and the other is not. 

 ==================================================================
 

The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170701.PDF

   

 

People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224 (11/21/2025): A Court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny an expungement and reduction

 

Case Name: People v. Murphy, Case #: A172224,

Court: CA Court of Appeal, District: 1 DCA, Division: 3, Opinion Date: 11/21/2025

In short, a court may not rely on unpaid victim restitution to deny either an expungement and reduction under PC 1203.4 or a reduction to a misdemeanor under PC 17. PC 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and PC 17(f) prohibit using unpaid restitution as “grounds for denial,” and here the court emphasized the outstanding restitution in denying both forms of relief, requiring remand for reconsideration.

  

Introduction

The California Legislature, in enacting Senate Bill 1106, established a clear mandate: the inability to satisfy a restitution order must not serve as a barrier to rehabilitation or reentry. This principle is codified in Penal Code sections 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and 17(f), which explicitly state that unfulfilled restitution "shall not be grounds for denial" of a petition for expungement or reduction. Recently, in People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611, the Court of Appeal confirmed that this language plainly prohibits trial courts from relying on unpaid restitution as a basis for denying relief—not only as a sole factor but as any factor at all.  In Murphy, the court reversed a denial because the trial judge improperly weighed the defendant’s outstanding debt against their request for relief, holding that such consideration constitutes a legal error and an abuse of discretion. Consequently, because the Petitioner here has met all other statutory requirements, this Court must grant the requested relief without regard to any outstanding restitution balance.

---

Key Legal References for Drafting a Motion on this Restitution point

Any attorney drafting a motion related to restitution should cite these specific sections and cases to strengthen the argument:

• People v. Murphy (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 611: The primary case holding that courts cannot use unpaid restitution "in any way" as a basis for denial.
• Penal Code § 1203.4(c)(3)(C): Prohibits denial of expungement due to unpaid restitution.⁶
• Penal Code § 17(f): Prohibits denial of a felony-to-misdemeanor reduction due to unpaid restitution.⁷
• Senate Bill 1106 (Stats. 2022, ch. 734): The legislative act that amended these codes to ensure that "expungement should be accessible to people who have been ordered to pay direct restitution."

========================================================================= 

COURT CASE SUMMARY:  People v. Murphy 

 Hayley Mackenzie Murphy moved to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 (undesignated statutory references are to this code) and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.1 The trial court denied her motion. In her appeal, she contends the court erred by relying — despite language in section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(3)(C) (section 1203.4(c)(3)(C)) and section 17, subdivision (f) (section 17(f)) — on unpaid restitution to deny her requests. Those provisions provide that “an unfulfilled order of restitution” or “unpaid order of restitution” “shall not be grounds for denial” of such requests.

 

This language, she argues, plainly prohibits courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny requests for expungement and reduction. We agree and reverse.

  

DISPOSITION: 

The trial court’s order denying Murphy’s petition for relief under sections 1203.4 and 17 is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.

 

 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EDITOR's NOTE: This may be an interesting case for arguments to put forth at a Parole Hearing for inmates that are being Denied a parole release for avoiding restitution. It would need to be a creative argument in front of the Board Of Parole Hearings (BPH).

 

FOR FULL OPINION: Note this link will eventually be obsolete from the Court. Download the case, to preserve the case on your device. There will be a Redirect Notice to this court website.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A172224.PDF